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ABSTRACT
PATRIMONIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TURKISH PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY
IN THE OZAL ERA
Buğra Özer
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Supervisor: Assistant Professor. E. Fuat Keyman
January 1998
This thesis analyzes patrimonial characteristics of Turkish public bureaucracy in the 
era between 1983-1993. Patrimonial taints within the structure of public bureaucracy 
will be elucidated from a diachronic perspective. The thesis will elaborate the 
revitalization of patrimonialism in the first half of 1980s signified with Motherland 
Party’s seizure of power in 1983. The study shall exclusively cover major policy 
changes targeting a societal change by New Right policies and transaction between 
New Right policies and transformation of bureaucracy. It shall also assert that 
patrimonial figures were revitalized by the New Right Policies’ applications.
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ÖZET
ÖZAL DÖNEMİ TÜRK KAMU BÜROKRASİSİNDEKİ PATRİMONYAL
ÖZELLİKLER
Buğra Özer
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç.Dr.E.Fuat Keyman 
Ocak 1998
Bu tez 1983-1993 yılları arasındaki, Özal dönemi Türk Kamu Bürokrasisinin 
patrimonyal özelliklerini incelemiştir. Türk Kamu Bürokrasisindeki patrimonyal 
özellikler tarihsel bir çerçeve içerisinde çalışılmıştır. İşbu çalışma 1980Terde 
Anavatan Partisi’nin iktidara gelmesiyle bürokratik yapı dahilinde güçlenmeye 
başlayan patrimonyal eğilimleri temel öğe olarak incelemiştir. Bu çalışma ayni 
zamanda 1980Terde Yeni Sağ politikalarıyla hedeflenen temel siyasi değişimlerini ve 
bu süreçte söz konusu politikalar dahilinde bürokrasisinin dönüşümünü işlemiştir. 
Ayni zamanda çalışmanın bir diğer hedefi de bürokratik yapıdaki patrimonyal 
eğilimlerin Yeni Sağ politikalar sürecinde güçlenmiş olduğunu göstermektir
Anahtar Sözcükler: Patrimonyalizm, Kamu Bürokrasisi, Yeni Sağ, Özal
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1 ·Patrimonial Characteristics o f  Turkish Public Bureaucracy in
the Ozal Era
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
The objective of this study is to analyze the patrimonial characteristics of 
Turkish public bureaucracy in the light of New Right Policies in Turkey. This study 
focuses the Ozal Era, from the first free elections held up in 1983 after the coup 
carried out in 1980 to the death of Ozal in his presidency in 1993. This era is vitally 
important in the sense that the New Right policies were integrated into the whole state 
structure. Public bureaucracy in this era unintendedly revitalized patrimonial 
tendencies in its structure due to the effects of New Right policies. Unlike its 
contemporaries, Turkish public bureaucracy responded to the structural changes in 
itself with intensifying cadrization and patronage. The thesis makes the point that the 
applications brought and initiated by the New Right policies strengthened the 
patrimonial taints in Turkish public bureaucracy in an unwanted way, which led to the 
present situation of Turkish public bureaucracy characterised by politicization and 
patronage. In the first instance, I will draw the political setting following the 1980 
coup.
1980 military intervention in Turkey occurred in the wake of a complete 
polarization and fragmentation of politics.^ The coup d’etat of September 12, 1980 
carried out by Turkish Military Forces commenced a new era in Turkish Politics. The 
political impasse in 1970s when conjoined with drawbacks in functioning of economy
' The word bureaucracy will be interchangeably used through the work both in the of 
organization sense and public bureaucracy
 ^Metin Heper, ‘State Democracy and Bureaucracy in Turkey’, (Metin Heper ed., The Stute_and
had already signalled likelihood of necessary structural changes in Turkish politics. 
Many high level bureaucrats and top politicians tried hard and attempted to assert 
structural transformation programs to overcome crisis, such as the Economic 
Decisions of January 24, 1980. However, these reforms did not yield the outcomes to 
get rid of the social, political and economic chaos from which Turkey was suffering. 
Rather, Turkey attempted to get rid of the chaotic atmosphere of political and 
economic impasse by abeyance of democratic multi party system. In fact, Turkish 
political system was going through a very difficult and overwhelmingly arduous stage, 
which required the preparation of a new constitution.
The generals, the heads of the militarial administration alleged that a new 
constitution had to be prepared to avoid the drawbacks of 1961 Constitution, such as 
polarization and immobilisme within the political system. The 1982 Constitution was 
craven for a strong executive, which concentrated power in the hands of the president 
both symbolically and effectively.^
Besides all these constitutional changes, in the eyes of the post-1980 military 
neither the politicians nor the bureaucratic intelligentsia of the 1960s and the 1970s 
enjoyed high esteem. The militarial elites opted for a government that would avoid 
acting fallaciously and would comply with the letter and the spirit of the new 
constitution 1982. On the other hand, the military junta of 1980 coup d’etat denounced 
those in the civil bureaucratic ranks and politicians as those who had long subscribed 
to ‘reactionary ideas’ and ‘perverted ideologies.*'  ^ Actually the militarial 
administration harmed active political involvement of former political cadres. The 
réintroduction of elections and the restarting of democratic process would exclude all
Public Bureaucracies, New York and London: Greenwood Press, 1987), p,135 
 ^Metin Heper, ibid.,p.l35
the former politicians except those who had harmonious relations with the military 
regime. Despite the fact that most of its members were not much favoured by the 
militarial administration, the Motherland Party got the majority of the votes in the 
1983 elections. The Motherland Party’s pursuit for power was blended by promises 
targeting new changes in the econo-political system. This became a major force for 
attracting a great deal of votes from the majority of electorates.
The post-1980 era in Turkish politics has also been unique on the ground that 
the political setting following the coup, re-allocated roles on the stage of Turkish 
politics. The dominance of New Right policies and the demise of the Welfare State 
paradigm were two main factors that led to the remaking of stage for Turkish politics 
in the 1980s’ conjecture of the country. Turkey’s continuing economical and political 
stress has intensified particularly after 1980 due to the interplay of various factors. 
The shift to an export promotion development strategy, then reconstitution of law and 
order, the progressively worsening income distribution, the emergence of a new type 
of individualism, and above all, the formation of a New Right movement were (are) 
among the striking developments leading to the new equilibrium.^ The new 
government of Motherland party came onto the stage with promising initiating a so- 
called ‘Great Transformation Program’ in every field of society. What the new status 
quo oriented to create was a new order, which would be distinguished by liberal- 
competitive, individualistic characteristics. In line with the New Right policies the 
Motherland Party drastically initiated the application of export substitution policies 
instead of import substitution policies that had been in effect since the establishment
'' Metin Heper, ibid., p .l36
^Muharrem Tünay , ‘The Turkish New Right’s Attempt at Hegemony’, The Political and 
Socioeconomic Transformation o f Turkey (Muharrem Tünay, Atila Eralp and Birol Yeşilada ed., 
Westport, Conn: Praeger,1993), pp.
of the Republican Era to foster the development of national economy and to aid the 
development of national bourgeoisie. ^
The Motherland Party also perceived the state in a different way within all its 
policies applied in the 1980s. Since they were complying with the dictates of the 
science of economics, the State would have to be drawn to the sphere where it was 
supposed to function. According to the cadres of Motherland Party, there was an 
overload in economical and social affairs under the jurisdiction area of the state. They 
believed in the necessity of remaking of the ‘state’ notion. The new state, according to 
the Motherland Party, would in no way intervene in the economic sphere; rather it 
would be preserved as a referee in the economic sphere. The sphere for them would 
regulate itself within its market system. They also asserted that ‘Despite free 
functioning of the market mechanisms, this model obviously rested upon the state 
direction of those which were ready for international competition’.’ This anti-statist 
notion is expressed ‘... antistatism, in this sense, is the elimination of the notorious 
bureaucratic red tape while continuing state intervention in the economy as before 
except for a change in its direction.’ * 
Through this promising sounding program, Ozal laid emphasis on the 
restructuring of public bureaucracy in line with the prerequisite of the new setting. 
According to Ozal, public bureaucracy was being a burden for the state. The bulk for 
Ozal was both in the economical and political sense. The bureaucracy was forming 
one of the sources of budget deficits and politically bureaucracy was curbing the 
attempts of politicians to restructure the political and economic system.
 ^Cağlar Keyder, Ulusal Kalkınmacılığın İflası, (Istanbul: Metis Yayınlan, 1993)
 ^Muharrem Tünay, ibid.,
* Atila Eralp, The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation o f Turkey,, (Muharrem Tünay, 
Atila Eralp and Birol Yesilada ed., Westport, Conn; Praeger,1993)
The target for Ozal was the minimisation of public sector. His view was that 
the public sector referred to all those fields in which state dominated economically 
and socially. When it is the case for public bureaucracy, he and his milieu thought that 
the departure point was to transform the legal rational model of bureaucracy into 
rational productive. Hence their aim was to palliate the functioning of bureaucracy 
according to the prerequisite of rational productive model. What the Motherland Party 
cadres failed to consider were patrimonialist figures embedded in the structuring of 
public bureaucracy
In the post-1980s Turkey, an attempt was made to render this politicised 
bureaucracy that evinced strong signs of patrimonialism, into a rational productive 
model. Some key agencies were selected as critical for the formulation and effective 
implementation of the structural adjustment program launched by the Motherland 
party governments. However the efforts made to render this process by means of 
bringing outsiders to the top echelons of the key agencies, turned out to undermine the 
efforts to transform the bureaucracy in the desired direction. The personal 
acquaintance, which played a significant role in the selection of the outsiders, 
contributed to the unsuccessful performance and even corruption on the part of 
outsiders. It was a complete fallacious process, which tried to realise the 
transformation of bureaucracy into the desired direction.
Within the perspective drawn, this work will mainly cover the changes in the 
Turkish Public Bureaucracy within the era of Turgut Ozal in terms of patrimonial 
figures within the structure of bureaucracy. The era in question will include both the 
prime ministry and the presidency of Ozal. I will identify main characteristics of the
 ^ Metin Heper and Selçuk Sancar, The Post-1983 Productive Model: The Case o f Patrimonial 
Rational Productivity, a typescript, 1996.
public bureaucracy of the Ozal Era and elucidate the repercussions of these 
patrimonial figures on the present structuring and functioning of public bureaucracy. 
The findings at the theoretical level will be backed up by results of in depth interviews 
carried out with a number of high level and middle level bureaucrats in the State 
Planning Organization (SPO) and the Undersecretariat for the Treasury (UFTT). The 
relations within public bureaucracy will be envisaged by changes on the main 
parameters of bureaucracy including authority, merit, delegation of power, and 
distance between the subordinate level and the high level bureaucrats.
In the initial stage, the present work will present theoretical framework which 
will handle the transformation of bureaucracy within the Weberian perspective. 1 will 
also devote myself to the succinct explanation of Weberian evaluation of bureaucratic 
theory. In this a historical framework will be presented relating to that of the 
development of bureaucracy. I will also explain the main Weberian types of 
bureaucratic models such as, the patrimonial model and legal-rational model. The last 
model that I will concentrate on is rational productive model, which is a post- 
Weberian theoretical framework to deal with the changing roles and structuring 
bureaucracy in the second half of the twentieth century. An explanation of types of 
rationality will also be presented to enable the understanding of the inner dynamics of 
bureaucratic models. In the evaluation of these models, I will define their main 
characteristics of these models.
In line with this theoretical framework, I will elucidate over bureaucratical 
development in Turkish polity within the types of bureaucracy which I have 
juxtaposed in the second chapter. I will put emphasis over the patrimonialism whose 
taints affected the development of Turkish bureaucracy in an overall context. The
' Metin Heper and Selçuk Sanear, ibid., p.33
6
patrimonial taints have been omnipotent in every stage of bureaucratic development. 
The patrimonial taints within Turkish bureaucratic development persisted in such a 
dogged way that it curbed the attempts to transform Turkish bureaucratic structure 
into the legal rational model.
The third chapter will concentrate on attempts both in the structural and inner 
organisational sense to transform Turkish bureaucracy into legal rational model. These 
attempts, which cumulated in the Republican Era, were unyielding due to the fact that 
patrimonial taints de-emphasized the formation and development of the legal 
dimension of bureaucratic development. On the other hand, one other incident that 
reinforces this argument is that bureaucratic development in Turkey was not 
accompanied by a balanced social development.
Turkish bureaucracy opposed these structural and organisational reforms to 
transform the bureaucracy into the legal rational model on the basis of legacy of the 
bureaucratic ruling tradition. In the other parts of the work, I will elaborate over the 
change of political setting in Turkey due to the effects of the New Right policies and 
coup d’etat carried out in 1980. These two changes have also inevitable effects on the 
structuring of bureaucratic development. The first change is that bureaucracy was no 
longer perceived as an active element of the structuring of a society. Actually, 
bureaucracy became a subsisted to be transformed in line with the target of New Right 
policies which was declared as the minimisation of the state. The second change is the 
attempts to render the bureaucracy into the rational-productive model, which turned 
out to be in vain due to the persistent effects of patrimonialism. I will also put forth 
that the New Right Policies which were trying to restructure bureaucracy in line with 
its targets, revitalized and accelerated patrimonial taints. In fact the transformation of
bureaucracy had several complex dimensions which failed due to patrimonialism.
7
In the concluding episode, I will reflect these points with a qualitative analysis 
carried out in the UFTT, and SPO. I will also assert that the New Right policies within 
the concerned era revitalised the patrimonial taints within Turkish bureaucracy and 
curbed the transformation of bureaucracy into the rational productive model.
Given the fact that many efforts were put forth in the field of bureaucracy, this 
work is a felicitous quest to define the characteristics of Turkish Public Bureaucracy 
within the Ozal Era, which germinated many radical transformations in Turkish 
political system.
CHAPTER II: EXPLANATORY NOTES ON THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK
This chapter will highlight the main concepts throughout the thesis. Although 
there are variety of ways to define bureaucracy, the Weberian perspective will be 
utilised to understand the patrimonialism inherent in Turkish Public Bureaucracy. 
Drawing the general framework, a general definition of patrimonialism will be made, 
being accompanied with the characteristics of the term. Consequently, there will be 
another subtitle dealing with patrimonialism and the authority dimension in 
bureaucracy. The final point about theoretical framework is the brief application of 
bureaucracy into the setting of Turkey.
2.1 General Definition of Bureaucracy in the Weberian Perspective
Bureaucracy as an entity will be explained in the initial stage within Weberian
perspective. Because of its similarity to the word ‘democracy’, which refers to a 
political system dominated by the rule of people, ‘bureaucracy’ has acquired a 
meaning of domination of a system held by people in bureaus." The word also 
extends to another sense of a system where bureaucrats play significant roles in 
structuring society. These people holding the power in bureaus claim that they stand 
for public good. Weber asserts the point that this public good notion denotes general
interest. 12
Weber tries to envisage bureaucracy as a result of capitalist development in the 
Western European context. The kings tried to increase their power at the expense of 
power held by feudal lords in the medieval ages. With the emergence of bourgeoisie.
"Metin Heper, ‘Bürokrasi’, Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, (İstanbul: İletişim 
Yayınlan, 1984), voİ. II, p.293
"Metin Heper, ‘Bürokrasi’, ibid., vol. II, p.293
the rulers started giving their support to this newly emerging class to concentrate their 
power in the centre.
According to Weber one may talk about four vitally important developments
on the way to capitalism. The first one was the concentration of political power at the
centre on the behalf of kings. The second development is the drastic increases in tax
revenues, which led to the enrichment of the central authority. In connection with this,
one more happening was that rulers started advocating mercantilist policies
throughout the country. The main headline about mercantilist policies were the
construction of new roads enabling trade activities throughout the country, more
emphasis put on restriction of raw materials from abroad and reliance upon purchases
of goods produced within the country. The fourth development was the support for
bourgeoisie, which required the preparation of a new set of legislations to be applied
1by a increasingly complex bureaucratic structure.
This is not to say that there was not a corresponding structure similar to 
bureaucracy, rather a body called Curia Regis did exist on the behalf of kings in 
medieval ages. This body which used to function as an advisory council to kings who 
shared power with feudal lords transformed itself to a body of aristocracy and servants 
of state. These elements of Curia Regis were charged with protection of the property 
of the king, defending the privileges of the king versus the Church and aristocratic 
elements, and the maintenance of order in the country. Hence this transformation of 
Curia Regis into this special body signifies a prototype of bureaucratic organization in 
itself
'^Metin Heper, ‘BUrokrasi’, ibid., vol. II, p.293
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2.2. Main Types of Bureaucratic Models in the Weberian and Post- Weberian 
Perspective
In fact, there is one more ingredient in the Weberian perspective. Organization 
of bureaucracy is shaped according to the authority type dominant in the political 
system. The first type of bureaucratic organization is the patrimonial type of 
bureaucracy. In this type of bureaucracy the authority type is patrimonialism. 
Patrimonialism legitimates itself on the basis of both traditions and charisma of the 
leader. The second defining characteristic of patrimonial system is the perception of 
people and property in the country as those of the ruler’s household.
The bureaucratic organization transforms itself into a complete chain of 
hierarchy in which the absolute loyalty is overemphasised in the patrimonial system. 
The criterion for determination of procedure and substance of any activity in this type 
of bureaucracy is the tradition. The criterion ‘tradition' also prepares legitimacy 
ground for the orders of rulers or any superior within bureaucracy. There is a great 
deal of ambiguity over rules and regulations for different jurisdiction areas. 
Notwithstanding the fact that there is simple division of work, no determined criterion 
rules these fields.
The second bureaucratic model that Weber develops is the legal rational 
model. Weber traces this model’s genesis back to the Industrial Revolution. On the 
other hand Sartori’s main point about the legal rational type of bureaucracy is of 
relation to the concept of general interest. The general interest is a result of historical 
transformation process. It is a reflection of the evolutionary process from the 
understanding of ‘L’etat c’est moi’ to the notion of general interest commonly 
accepted as common good. In the first phase of socio-economic development, it is 
accepted that the general interest can be determined by a number of political and
11
bureaucratic elites who do not favour the demands of newly emerging and developing 
classes in society, namely the bourgeoisie. As this transformation goes on, the middle 
classes compulse these bureaucratic elites and political elites to turn an ear to their 
demands. It is because of the fact that this new class wants to envisage a mechanism 
complex enough to arrange the bourgeoisie’s activities and enable the bourgeoisie 
more facilities about trade activities. On the other hand, this process requires the 
reorganisation of bureaucracy in the desired direction of the demands of the 
bourgeoisie.Abadan-Unat also states that the development of middle class is a 
prerequisite to exert influence upon bureaucracy in line with the prerequisites of 
accumulation process.'^
The legal-rational model of bureaucracy has a clear and determined set of 
rules and regulations. It clearly stipulates the duties and responsibilities of both 
superiors and subordinates in comparison to the patrimonial type of bureaucracy, 
which has a complete ambiguity on these issues. The main legitimisation of authority 
derives its potential from the written and clear rules and regulations and legislation. It 
has extensively determined the borders of jurisdiction areas of superiors. The 
recruitment and appraisal processes have been clearly defined according to distinct 
criteria. By the same token, in contrast to patrimonial type of bureaucracy which 
grants great deal of discretionary power to superiors, the legal rational type 
distinguishes itself with restricted discretionary power. Weber signifies this in his own 
words:
‘... The reduction o f modern office management to rule is deeply embedded in
its very nature. The theory o f the modern public administration for instance assumes
Giovanni Sartori, ‘Representational Systems’ in the International Encyclopedia o f the Social 
Sciences (New York: Me Millan and Free Press, 1968), vol. 3, pp. 59-60
Nermin Abadan Unat Bürokrasi (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1974)
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that the authority to order certain matters by decree which has been legally granted to 
an agency doesn’t entitle the agency to regulate the matter by individual commands 
given for each case, not to regulate the matter abstractly.'
Apart from these charaeteristics, more Weberian concepts will aid us to 
understand the functioning of these types of bureaucracy. Two concepts are of high 
importance in relation to rationality types, namely the substantial rationality and the 
instrumental rationality. The former overemphasises ‘getting an objective 
accomplished’. In the accomplishment of this objective, the bureaucratic system relies 
upon the aims of political elites. The latter emphasizes how the objectives are
17accomplished.
One extra model developed in a post-Weberian way is the rational productive 
model. Technological developments and complexization of administrative affairs in 
the second half of the twentieth century caused the legal rational model cease to be 
assertive and to function in proper way. Ilchmann asserts this model into the 
literature of bureaucracy. Ilchmann states that within these technological 
developments, bureaucracy needs to be re-organised. He proposes that in era of high- 
technology bureaucracy needs to flexibilize, and it should lay more emphasis on 
productivity. In his conception the rational productive model should be more and 
more substantive rationality oriented in contrast to the legal rational model, which 
relies upon instrumental rationality.*^ Some of the scholars like Friedrich assert that 
the rational productive model is the ideal type of legal rational model according to
Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline o f Interpretive Sociology (Gunther Roth and 
Claus Wittich ed., 2 vols., Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1978), vol. 1, p.
’’ Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait, (New York: Doubleday and 
Company Inc., 1962), pp. 368-369
'* David Silverman, The Theory o f the Organisations: A Sociological Perspective (London: 
Heinemann, 1970), p. 74
Warren Ilchmann, ‘Productivity, Administrative Reform and Anti-politics: Dilemmas for 
Developing States’, (Brabianti ed.. Political and Administrative Development,\969), p. 476
13
Weber’s original framework. Ilchmann opposes this claim on the ground that Weber 
did not use the term productivity to define the rational productivity as the ideal type of 
legal rational model. The second ground for this is that the legal rational model relies 
upon the instrumental rationality in contrast to the rational productive model, which 
emphasizes substantial rationality. The development of the rational productive model 
is due to the nourishment of specialised knowledge and the high professionalization in 
the second half of the twentieth century.^®
The rational productive model preserves the basic pillars of legal rational 
model. Here it should be noted that there are some structural changes in the 
structuring of bureaucratic model. The first characteristic is that this model tries to 
minimize hierarchy. In fact, déconcentration of authority is exercised in its extreme 
dimension. The rational productive model also proposes that there should be an 
effective coordination among units. It also brings the prerequisite that more emphasis 
be laid upon staff units in comparison to the legal rational model, which emphasizes 
line units. Again in contrast to the legal rational model relying upon seniority and 
experience in the practice of recruitment and appraisal process, the rational 
productive model de-emphasizes these pillars. The rational-productive model also 
suggests that devolution of authority^^ be often utilised.^^
There is an evolutionary type of development that the legal rational model is a 
prerequisite type to go through the rational productive model of bureaucracy. There is
Harold Wilensky, ‘ Professionalization for Everyone’, American Journal o f Sociology, 
September 1969, p .l49
^'Metin Heper, Türk Кати Bürokrasisinde Gelenekçilik ve Modernleşme : Siyaset Sosyolojisi 
Açısından Bir İnceleme, ffsXznbviV. Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınlan, 1977)
^^The déconcentration o f authority and the devolution o f authority are two different technical 
terms, which have to be distinguished. The first one is that you delegate the authority to a subordinate 
for the routine activities and the responsibility still is at the superior who has delegated the authority. In 
comparison to the delegation of authority, the devolution o f authority refers to the incident that a 
superior delegates the authority and the responsibility belongs to the subordinate to whom the authority
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some kind of alliance between these patterns despite the structural changes such as the 
emphasis laid upon the efficiency to carry out policies formulated with minimum cost 
in comparison to the rational productive model which targets the effectiveness to 
carry out policies. This alliance is realised in the way that the political responsiveness 
of legal-rational model is moderated by the anti-politics of the rational productive 
model. The second step is that the objective assessment of merit £ind the impersonal 
order of the legal rational model avoid the possible abuse of patrimonial taints which 
might infringe upon the essence of conditions required to maintain the framework of 
the rational productive model
This study will apply this evolutionary development of bureaucracy into the 
context of Turkey. Rather an attempt will be made to cover this bureaucratic 
development under the dominance of patrimonial taints with exclusive scope on the 
Ozal Era. Preceding this core, patrimonialism will be elucidated over with the 
persistence of patrimonialism in this bureaucratic development. The patrimonial type 
of bureaucratic model will be elaborated with its characteristics such as authority 
dimension, merit dimension, and division of work, delegation of authority, appraisal 
and recruitment process.
Turkish public bureaucracy finds itself in a dilemma. In other words it neither 
has been able to realise transformation from the legal rational model to the rational 
productive model nor it could experience a balanced socio-economic development. 
This becomes more and more concrete in the post 1983 public bureaucracy with 
starving attempts to transform bureaucracy to the rational productive model, being
has been delegated for the thing done.
23,Oğuz Onaran, ‘Yetki Göçerimi’, Amne idaresi Dergisi, (June 1974), p. 18 
'^'Metin Heper and Selçuk Sancar, The Post-1983 Productive Model: The Case o f Patrimonial
Rational Productivity, a typescript, 1996, p .l4
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given short shrifts by the patrimonial figures inherent in the nature of bureaucracy.
2.3. Characteristics of Patrimonialism
One of the main pillars of the patrimonial authority is the traditional authority.
The traditional authority in its simplest form is gerontocracy^^and patriarchy. In both 
of the cases, the leader or the patriarch has to take under consideration the interests of 
individual members within group. Those who hold authority within patrimonial order 
do not have such a complex tool of administration. Mutual and all common activities 
are ruled according to the reciprocity principle. The patriarch or the leader of group, 
tribe or any community in which the tradition becomes motor of legitimisation for the 
collectivity, is concerned with coordination of activities.^^
Rather than formality principle of legal rational model, there is informality 
principle in the rules which regulate the relations between superiors and subordinates. 
Consequently, since there is no formality^^which defines rules and regulations 
between superiors and subordinates, loyalty becomes an emphasized factor. Due to the 
fact that traditional authority has no integrative characteristic, informality becomes the 
defining characteristic of the patriarchal order.^ ® Bureaucracy in this interconnected 
chain of loyalty is no longer a chain of hierarchy, by the same token, it is a set of 
mutual loyalty system. According to Weber it is only the patrimonialist system where 
it includes not free individuals.^^ In his ideal type of legal rational system, individuals 
are free and bureaucracy is their life time career.
^^Gerontocracy refers to the rule o f the old
^^Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline o f Interpretive Sociology (Gunther Roth and 
Claus Wittich ed., 2 vols., Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1978), vol. I, p .231
^^The formality refers to the standardisation o f relations between people and there comes the 
need to govern and regulate these relations on the basis o f the so should-be appropriate action. On the 
other hand the informality refers to a system where these relations have not been able to be 
standardised.
^'Weber, ibid., vol. I, p. 221 
’^Weber, ibid., vol. 1, p. 227
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The patrimonial bureaucracies have one distinct characteristic. The loyalty is 
to a person who stands traditionally rather than to an elected figure. The patriarch or 
the leader’s orders are legitimated on the basis of traditions. It is the traditions which 
legitimate the whip of leader and determine the content and boundaries of these 
orders. These orders are legitimate only if traditional leaders give these orders on the 
basis of traditions. The patrimonial leaders have unlimited discretionary power. This 
power may be utilised freely without subscription to any set of written rules. The 
principles which draw limits for these orders are morality, good will, and equality in 
abstract sense.^® Weber concretizes these concepts by presenting the sultanates and 
such forms of bureaucracy servile to these authority types as extreme forms of 
patrimonialism. This extreme form of patrimonial type of bureaucracies is a system in 
which the Sultan and or any administrator relies upon his personal discretionary power 
rather than tradition.^*Due to the limited institutionalisation in the patrimonial 
bureaucracies, there appears a conflict between different units of bureaucracy about 
powers and duties of different sections of society. The ambiguous boundaries within 
these powers and duties of bureaucratic units may vary according to the will and whip 
of administrator.
About the recruitment process the ambiguity in the patrimonial system still 
proceeds. In order to be recruited into ranks of bureaucracy, the prerequisite becomes 
the fact the incumbents should come from a certain status group. It comes in contrast 
to the qualifications explicitly and exclusively sought for by the legal rational type of 
bureaucracy. So people who are to be recruited into ranks of bureaucracy need not be 
having exclusive characteristics determined on the basis of written rules. Since there is
^°Weber, ibid., vol. I, p. 227 
Weber, ibid., vol. I, pp. 231-232
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no job specification and there is no job classification, the recruitment is realised
32procedurally for the sake of institutionalisation of the subjective goal of the leader.
In patrimonial types of bureaucracies there are no clear boundaries specifying 
duties and responsibilities of superiors and subordinates. Moreover there is a little 
differentiation among roles, which means that a subordinate should be loyal to his 
superior.^^ The ambiguity over job specification leads to an another incidence that 
neither superior nor subordinates know each other well. It is also of high note that a 
subordinate doesn’t really know to whom h/she is responsible. It is not generally clear 
whether a subordinate will be responsible to the superior or h/she will be responsible 
to the people appointed by the superior.
The leader of the group personally makes job specification and job definition in 
a patrimonial system. Instead of a job definition and a job specification made on the 
basis of objective criteria, patrimonial bureaucracy has a ‘from day to day changing’ 
criterion, in other words, adhocly formed organizationally.
Social status becomes a determining factor in the recruitment process, rather 
than the qualifications held by subordinates. On the other hand status affects such 
kinds of intra-organisational settings such as space between superiors and 
subordinates, delegation of authority and recruitment and appraisal process. Of 
relation to the social distance between superiors and subordinates, the main cleavage 
becomes the social status. At times when patrimonial bureaucracy starts to play very 
important political roles, those of higher echelons of bureaucracy will form political 
elites. Social distance between the superiors and subordinates avoids development of 
the use of delegation of authority. In fact it will be true to say that in a context of
Weber, ibid., vol. I, pp. 229-230 
Weber, ibid., vol. I, p .l026, p.l028
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organization in which there is a dearth of job specification and definition, there will 
not be an effective delegation of authority. In other words a subordinate will not have 
enough autonomy in the process of decision making.
In terms of merit, recruitment and appraisal process for bureaucratic 
organization are also affected by social status factor. Appointments to bureaucratic 
posts are made on basis of kinship and monopoly of a special cadre dominating 
bureaucracy. The persistence of traditional norms and rules dominating bureaucracy 
have understated the importance of personal qualifications and substituted personal 
loyalty instead of it.
This has been a brief account juxtaposing the significant characteristics of 
patrimonialism. My study will not put forth the claim that Turkish Public Bureaucracy 
is patrimonial in its purest form. It would be convenient to say that there were really 
hard attempts to unchain these characteristics of bureaucracy tainted by 
patrimonialism. In fact the transformation attempts to render bureaucracy legal 
rational model commence with modernisation movement started at the institutional 
level in the Ottoman Era. Findley asserts the fact that the shift from traditional to 
rational legal authority remained incomplete largely because the processes of 
rationalisation and regulation were often subverted to serve the ends of patrimonial 
discretionalism.^"*
Carter Vaughn Findley, Ottoman Civil Officialdom^ (New Jersey; Princeton University 
Press, 1989)
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2.4. Turkish Context and Patrimonialism
This study will view Turkish public bureaucracy as a typical example coming
from a patrimonial past. In fact, the bureaucratic apparatus of Ottoman Empire was 
belonging to a more inclusive level as a patriarchal monarchy, that is, a state 
conceived of the model of a vastly extended household having really a long back 
ground tracing back to gazi traditions. Despite the attempts to transform patrimonial 
structure into a legal rational model, these attempts gained nothing than to change the 
formal procedures. In fact, the attempts to eliminate patrimonial figures were utilised 
to assert neo-patrimonialism by the reformers whether it be in the Republican era or 
whether it be in the Ottoman era. Findley makes the point of the Ottoman Era that 
‘Yet in proportion, as Ottoman reformers began deliberately changing inherited 
patterns defined by tradition, they had no choice but to use reason to develop their 
plans and then, if they were to project their plans effectively, to embody them in laws
n C
and regulations.’
Even though the Republican era claimed that they were not inheriting any 
legacy of Ottoman era, they continued to preserve institutions having patrimonial 
features. The Republican era sought for high loyalty to the regime since its 
establishment. Nevertheless as Faroz Ahmad asserted that Republic of Turkey did not 
rise out of the ashes of Ottoman Empire like a phoenix^^, the Republican regime 
preferred to educate its new elite cadre in its new schools. These new cadres were to 
be loyal to the republican regime. That was why the republican regime attempted to 
eliminate public bureaucracy of the former regime by heavy-handed politics^’, though
35
36r
Findley, ibid., p.9
Faroz Ahmad, The Making o f Modern T u r k e y York and London: Routledge, 1995), p. 
3
^^Metin Heper, ‘Bureaucracy in the Ottoman Turkish Polity’ in Handbook o f Bureaucracy, ( 
Ali Farazmand ed.. New York: MNarcel Dekker, 1994), pp. 659-674
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Atatürk tried to regain their confidence in the further instance.^* In the following years 
of the republican era, public bureaucracy came to mission themselves as the guardian 
of the basic pillars of the republic. This also did signify that they were more 
instrumental rationality oriented. This attitude of bureaucracy continued in the multi 
party regime which was introduced in the real sense since 1950s. The political elites 
also desired to envisage a bureaucracy completely servile to the mandator in the 
Weberian sense. The bureaucratic elites reacted to this happening with measures, 
which tried to curb the power of political elites. The bureaucratic elites sabotaged the 
policies formulated by the political elites and used negative politics versus the 
political elites. However, the political elites preferred a completely servile 
bureaucracy. The most important criterion for the political elites became loyalty.
38 Doğan Avcıoğlu, Türkiye’nin Düzeni, Dün, Bugün, Yarın (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1969)
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CHAPTER III. PATRIMONIALISM IN TURKISH PUBLIC 
BUREAUCRACY
3.1. Historical Legacy of the Ottoman Era
The main factors for patrimonial type of bureaucracy were omnipresent in the
Ottoman polity such as the sharp cleavage between centre and periphery , perception 
of the country as the household of the ruler and the traditional bases of political power 
as a motor of legitimisation. To say that Ottoman Legacy of bureaucratic ruling 
tradition is completely in purest form patrimonial is difficult in Weberian theoretical 
framework. The difficulty arises from the fact that Weber identified this concept as an 
ideal type but never drew the boundaries of this system in a determinate way.'*® The 
term has been analysed to be a contra model versus the legal rational model of 
bureaucracy.
insel asserts that in order to comprehend Ottoman Bureaucracy, 
patrimonialism must be deemed to be a political and social setting.'*' There are two 
important characteristics related to this political and social system. The first one is that 
state has total control and regulation power over the economy. Meanwhile the state 
has the right to expropriate property under the motto ‘Devlet mülktür ’ denoting that all 
the property is the state’s household.'*^ The second dimension is that state conceives 
society a totality of autonomous gemeinschafts.'*^
Since our scope is to deal with patrimonial characteristics of public
Şerif Mardin ‘ Centre and Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics’ Daedelus, 
102(1973): 169-190
Max, Weber, ibid., vol. 1, P.238
Ahmet Insel, Türkiye Toplummun Bunalımı. ( Istanbul: İletişim Yayınlan), p. 29
İlkay Sunar, State and Society in the Politics o f Turkey’s Development, (Ankara, 1974) and 
the issue is dealed in more details in works o f Niyazi Berkes, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, (Istanbul, 1972), 1. 
Cilt, pp. 60-61 and Taner Timur, Osmanli Toplumsal Düzeni, Ankara ,1979), p. 219
Ahmet Insel, Türkiye Toplumunun Bunalımı. ( Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları), p. 33
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bureaucracy, this work will limit itself to the characteristics of bureaucracy. This will 
analyze the basic dimensions of bureaucracy. This short account has been given in 
order to understand in what kind of context the bureaucratic apparatus was 
consolidated in the Ottoman era. There formed a bureaucratic ruling tradition in which 
the ruler assumed an unconditional loyalty to himself. In the following centuries, 
institutions with which the emperor shared power assumed absolute loyalty from the 
subordinates serving for the state. The Sultan enjoyed his absolute power over the 
institutions in the Ottoman bureaucratic structure. By the same token, the ruler rarely 
practiced the principle of delegation of authority. The authority is not 
institutionalised.'''^ Within the intraorganizational setting in the Ottoman bureaucracy 
no superior knows how many people work for a subunit on the ground that there is no 
determined division of work. As time went by, the Ottoman Administration did begin, 
in a ragged way often clearer in concept than implementation, to take on the traits of a 
modern bureaucracy, as opposed to those of the earlier scribal corps.''^
Firstly it is a necessity that these characteristics of modem bureaucracy should 
be mentioned. Weber identifies these officials personally free. The second point is that 
offices should be hierarchically organised. It means that each office should have 
distinct and specific functions, that the officials’ obligations should be contractually 
limited (as opposed to the patrimonial officials’ unconditional personal dependence on 
the sovereign), that officials should be recruited on the basis of their qualifications 
realised by examinations. On the other hand they should be compensated by salary. 
The office must be their sole or at least primary occupation, that there should be a
Şerif Mardin, ‘Power , Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire’, Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, 11 (1969): 258-281
“'^Carter Vaughn Findley, Ottoman Civil Officialdom. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1989), p. 8
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definite career pattern with promotion by seniority and merit."^  ^ By the same token 
officials would acquire no proprietary right in their posts or in the resources that went 
with them. Officials should be subject to a unified system of disciplinary control in the
conduct of their duties 47
Contrary to these characteristics, the whip of the ruler plays a significant role 
and bureaucracy puts emphasis on procedural grounds in the Ottoman bureaucracy. 
The recruitment criteria are absolute loyalty to the Sultan, being a man of Islam and 
knowledge of Ottoman traditions. These are socialised through bureaucracy on the 
basis of education. Moreover people being recruited for bureaucratic posts are selected 
among known surroundings of former bureaucrats. These offsprings and relatives of 
the former bureaucrats inherit these posts.
The basis of this inheritance is realised on the ground that Ottoman Emperor 
could not pay for salaries for a long time to bureaucrats due to the bottlenecks of 
Ottoman economy starting with the seventeenth century. These so known relatives of 
former bureaucrats gain these posts with proof of these debts of the state to 
bureaucrat’s family. Meanwhile, contrary to the legal rational model most of these 
bureaucrats did not conceive bureaucracy as a lifetime career. It was most of the time 
a second source of income.
Despite starving attempts to transform bureaucracy into legal rational model, 
there were reasons that curbed this process. The first reason was that Ottomans added 
new elements into the system but they always failed to consider that they had to 
abolish old traditions and parts. The outcome was a complex hierarchical bureaucratic
‘'^Martin Albrow, Bureaucracy, ( London: Me Millan, 1970),
‘'^Max Weber Economy and Society: An Outline o f Interpretative Sociology, (ed. Guenther 
Roth and Claus Wittich, 2 vols., Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1978), vol. 1, pp. 220-221,
Carter Vaughn Findley ‘The Legacy of tradition to reform: Origins o f the Ottoman Foreign 
Ministry’ International Journal o f Middle East Studies, III (1972)
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system. The Ottomans did not also realise the place of bureaucracy in relation to 
society. The second reason is that Ottomans preferred to create new institutions as 
alternative to those institutions which were resisting new changes and they never 
considered bureaucracy as an institution totally to reform.
The centre, which extended its strong influence until the republican era, did 
appoint members of elected assemblies of municipalities. Rather than formality, 
informality had been a persisting factor at bureaucracy of 1800s. Even in the 
Reformation era signified with Tanzimat, the reformers relied upon this principle. 
Loyalty to the existing regime was overemphasised which traced back to the era of 
Abdulhamid II.
In this bureaucratic structure, of relation to merit system, the reformers never 
practiced this principle. The loyalty factor was always dominant in Ottoman era. In 
recruitment and appraisal process, there neither existed effective measures and 
techniques nor there were legal and formal notification of examinations by which the 
possible incumbents could be informed. Even examinations which were held in order 
to test candidates for bureaucratic posts had nothing to do with the job specification. 
The space setting of bureaucratic organization was a space, which was in a state of 
chaos. The relations between superiors and subordinates resembled of that between an 
apprentice and a master. This meant that there was no inner house education system, 
which enabled bureaucrats to learn how activities of bureaucracy were carried out in 
the Ottoman Era. The bureaucrats rather learned how to become loyal agents of their 
superior echelons.
In the republican era, one can also observe the fact that these tendencies were 
continued in the republican Era in the same patterns. The reformation movement for
rendering bureaucracy to the legal rational model did not yield much on the ground
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that reforms were carried out with the same mentality of those carried out in the 
Ottoman era. Even Atatürk did not even think that reformation would have to be 
accompanied by a compatible change in socioeconomic system of Turkey. According 
to Bent, when Kemalist reforms were being consolidated in society, people were being 
recruited into bureaucratic posts on the basis of loyalty factor.“*^ Those who wouldn’t 
react to the reforms were the most suitable ones for high levels of bureaucracy. On the 
other hand Republican regime did not do anything to change the obstinate and 
reactionary lower echelons of bureaucracy who were not complying with the mentality 
of the new regime. One exception to this thing was the October 1,1922 legislation. By 
means of this legislation, many bureaucrats of lower echelons were dismissed and 
different agencies of bureaucracy were granted the right to substitute these cadres 
emptied by those who were dismissed.^'’ In other words, it was a way of arranging the 
bureaucracy on the basis of loyalty.
The bureaucracy of republican regime appointed itself as a consolidator and 
guardian of Kemalist reforms in society. They had a different notion of general 
interest, which they thought could only be determinated by them. Turkish Bureaucracy 
persisted on the stand that they had to be guardian of the so-called pillars of the 
Republic.
1961 Constitution was on the behalf of bureaucracy and gave bureaucratic 
elites constitutional legality in their struggle with political elites. On the other 1971 
military takeover supported them more. The bureaucratic elites developed a 
worldview of state capitalism whereas the political elites and the surroundings
Frederick T.Bent ‘ The Turkish Bureaucracy as an Agent of Change’ Journal o f 
Comparative Administration (M ay, 1969)
Metin Heper, Türk Кати Bürokrasisinde Gelenekçilik ve Modernleşme: Siyaset Sosyolojisi 
Açısından Bir İnceleme, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1977)
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advocating political elites and the political elites failed to develop a totally coherent
51and exclusive worldview.
The intraorganizational characteristics of Turkish Bureaucracy may be 
juxtaposed as follows. Loyalty to leaders to leader such as Atatürk ‘the great leader’, 
İnönü ‘the National Chef was overemphasised. Many of the echelons of public 
bureaucracy were surpassed in order to get objectives accomplished. Even when 
Menderes, Prime Minister of Turkey (1950-1960) faced a severe political crisis. 
Council of Ministers had to resign except the premier figure, which he realised by a 
decree in the force of law.
One other evidence for patrimonialism in Turkish bureaucracy is that there 
were no homogeneous job classifications and job specifications within bureaucratic 
organization. There was an inflation of different titles. The promotions were made on 
the basis of personal will accompanied with great difficulty in coordination.
This lack of formality on job specification, job classification etc. leads to 
unreliability on subordinates and dominance of superiors. The dominance of superiors 
required loyalty in an unconditional way.^  ^ This became concrete in the Report 
prepared by Martin and Cush for the Ministry of Finance. This also supports our 
finding that financial matters once evaluated within local authorities were transferred 
to the jurisdiction area of central authority in 1920s. It was because of the fact that the 
local authorities caused corruption. These developments gave way to the perception of 
bureaucracy by legislative and executive as if bureaucracy were to deviate from
Nezih Tevfik, ‘The Middle Classes in Turkey’, Social Change and Politics in Turkey 
(Netherlands: E.J. Brill, Leiden), pp. 123-151
^^Cem Eroglu, Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi, (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1970) (Ankara 
Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayını, No 294).
^^Maurice Chaillox Dantel ‘ Türkiye 'de Devlet Personel Teşkilatı Hakkında Bir Araştırma ’ ( 
T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Personel Dairesi, Hükümete Sunulan Yabancı Raporları), p. 118
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policies formulated anytime. '^*
Turkish public bureaucracy never emphasized merit principle properly about 
recruitment process. In the recruitment appraisal process, there were not proper 
appraisal methods and techniques of examination. Mih9ioglu asserted that juries from 
a certain echóle like Mülkiye (Ankara University, Department of Political Science and 
Public Administration) were not neutral at the evaluation of candidates from Mülkiye 
at the recruitment process. About promotion and demotion policies, principle of 
seniority was not only applied. Moreover examinations were not formally and publicly 
notified. In cases where seniority condition was the same for bureaucrats, merit 
principle came onto the stage.^  ^ In fact demotion policies were never applied on the 
basis of unsuccess but on the personal criterion. The two important criteria were, 
personal will and to which political cadre a bureaucrat belonged to, on promotion and 
demotion policies. In the organisational sense to be able to measure merit principle a 
system has to have clarity about job definition and job specification.
Here one also should mention about backgrounds where bureaucrats are 
recruited. Between 1860-1949 the dominance of bureaucrats from Marmara Region 
fell from 46% to 38% meaning that graduates recruited in bureaucracy were coming 
from a large and varied geography from Aegean, Black Sea, Mediterranean Region. 
The cadres were mostly composed of middle class families with the exception of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which included high-class families. It was interesting that 
those recruited into bureaucratic posts were those whose fathers were bureaucrats in 
the same institution which goes in line with the Ottoman legacy.
James Martinand Frank E. Cush,_Administration o f the Turkish Ministry o f Finance ,( 
Ankara: Ministry o f Finance, 1951)
^^Cemal Mıhçıoğlu, ‘ Türkiye’de Memuriyete Girişte Liyakat Meselesi’ Ankara Üniversitesi 
S.B.F Dergisi^ (Mart, 1958) and ‘Development o f Senior Administrators in Turkey’, Ankara 
Üniversitesi S.B.F. Derg/s/,(Eylül, 1968)
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The reformation movement went on in the Republican era in order to 
restructure bureaucracy. Foreign scholars prepared different reform programs. Several 
attempts such as the preparation of MEHTAP (Plan for the Reformation of 
Institutional Structuring of the Centralized Government), establishment of the State 
Planning Organization, State Personnel Department to design direction of 
administrative reform and manipulate it.^^The reform programs did not yield much. 
There were three reasons for this incident. The first one is that no serious research had 
been done to cover issue. The second one is that qualified people were not recruited to 
continue called reformation movement. The final point is that programs definitely 
failed to prepare the framework of assertive measures. This was also asserted that by 
Tutum that political authority never showed eagerness to carry out measures of the
Reform programs.57
‘^'Kenan Sürgit, Türkiye’de İdari Reform ,^ (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1972), p.72 
’^Cahit Tutum, ‘Türkiye’de Personel Reformu Üzerine Düşünceler’, Amne İdaresi 
Derg/i/,(Haziran ,1968), Devlet Memurları Kanununun Genel Bir Eleştirisi’, Amne İdaresi Dergisi, 
(Aralık, 1974), ‘Gerçekleştirilmeyen Reform: Personel Reformu’, Amne İdaresi Dergisi, (Eylül, 1973)
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3.2. Political Developments and Patrimonial Taints of Bureaucracy in the 
Republican Era
This subtitle will make a brief account of the political and bureaucratical 
development in the Republican era. The study will analyze developments in three time 
intervals namely the first, second, and the third republic. The first republic extends 
from the promulgation of the republic (October 29,1923) to the coup d’etat of 
1960(May 27,1960), the second republic area extends to the landmark of the coup 
d’etat inl980 (September 12,1980).
The First Republic mostly involved the attempts to transform society from 
above, being accompanied by the attempts turn bureaucracy into the legal rational 
model. The new model would have to be the most suitable one for the regime and the 
transformation trying to change society from above.^^ Since many of the bureaucratic 
elites did not support the National Independence War, Atatürk used heavy-handed 
politics to eliminate bureaucracy’s reaction to the regime. Despite the fact that the 
Republican regime tried to regain their confidence, this did not yield much. To 
eliminate these cadres, the new regime created new institutions to recruit new elites of 
bureaucracy. The new bureaucratical elements soon came to be guardians of the new 
republican regime’s pillars, such as nationalism, secularism, etatism etc. Reformism 
soon came to mean preserving and safeguarding these principles. The institutional 
transformations became ends when they should only have been means.^^
In Kemalist conception, bureaucracy was a “structure organised on the basis of 
strict hierarchy which would act by the letter of law with the staffing of civil servants
Metin Heper, Türk Кати Bürokrasisinde Gelenekçilik ve Modernleşme : Siyaset Sosyolojisi 
Açısından Bir İnceleme, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1977), p.96
59,Şerif Mardin, ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution’, International Journal o f
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on the basis of merit”. This conception depicts that the target was the legal-rational 
model.
Meanwhile, the clash between the political and bureaucratic elites traced back 
to the making of 1921 Constitution. Despite the fact that liberal surroundings such as 
notables and big landowners attempted to curb the power of bureaucratic elites, they 
preferred to remain silent at the last instance.®’ 1950s severed this clash. The 
bureaucratic elites deemed Kemalism as a type of ideology and they came to be 
ambitious and ardent advocates of Kemalism, which may be deemed to be a 
worldview (Weltanschauung) in Weberian terms. The bureaucrats did not think that 
society had the potential to develop itself in stead of that that they preferred continuos 
struggle to change society in an imposed way from above.
The political elites opposed to the etatist policies. They expressed the reason 
for this standpoint that they thought that it was about time capitalist transformation 
process under the domination of the state were thought over and criticised. They, 
however, contributed to this state capitalism with the development of State Economic 
Enterprises in quantity. The bureaucratic elites opposed to these policies of political 
elites.
This developmental approach had repercussions on the restructuring of 
bureaucracy in two ways, one of which was the recruitment of bureaucrats of high 
specialisation and expertise, especially from engineers.®  ^ The second development
Middle East Studies, II, 3, 1971, pp. 197-211
"^ ^Metin Heper, Atatürk and the Civil Bureaucracy in Atatürk and the Modernization o f Turkey, 
(Landlau ed., Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 89-97
^'Taner Timur, Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası 1919-1946 (Ankara: Doğan Yayınları), pp.41-42 
“  Metin Heper, ‘State Democracy and Bureaucracy in Turkey’, (Metin Heper ed., The State 
and Public Bureaucracies, New York and London: Greenwood Press, 1987), p,135
“ Gencay Şayian, “Bürokrasi”, Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, (İstanbul: İletişim 
Yayınları, 1984), vol. II, p. 303
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64was the reorganisation of public administration on the basis of “regions of service 
These regional organisations were recruited with new types of bureaucrats who later 
on broke up with the traditional bureaucrats. The reason was that the political elites 
tried to pacify bureaucracy in terms of salaries and discouraged people to go through 
bureaucracy. They showed apathy to the advisory statements of bureaucracy. The last 
measure was the creation of alternative subsections within bureaucracy. They 
discriminated those technocratic elites against traditional bureaucratic elites by means 
of giving higher salaries to them. 1961 Constitution which gave constitutional legality 
to the bureaucracy in Turkey also established agencies to curb power of political elites 
such as the establishment of State Planning Organization and the Constitutional Court. 
In the post 1960s the political elites tried to politicise bureaucracy which was granted 
large veto powers. The second measure was that they subscribed to negative politics 
wherein they became less willing and showed less eagerness to participate and 
sabotaged policies.^^
This has been a brief account of political development and bureaucratic change 
till 1980s. Since our scope is the post-1980 stage for public bureaucracy, this chapter 
has been limited and the post 1980 will be dealed in more details as a separate chapter.
‘^'Şeref Gözübüyük, İdare Hukukuna Giriş, (Ankara: Turhan Kitapevi, 1995)
^^Metin Heper, ‘Negative Bureaucratic Politics in a Modernizing Context: The Turkish Case’, 
Journal o f South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 1(1977) :65-84
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CHAPTER IV: PATRIMONIAL TAINTS OF TURKISH 
PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY IN THE OZAL ERA
4.1. New Right Movement and Patrimonialism in the Public Bureaucracy of the 
OzalEra^  ^(1983-1993)
This chapter elaborates the patrimonial taints of Turkish public bureaucracy 
extending from the premiership of Ozal in 1983 elections to the death of Turgut Ozal 
in his era of presidency in 1993. The main effort throughout the work is to initially 
analyze the role of public bureaucracy and perception of public bureaucracy within 
this certain period of time then to follow this by the interrogation of changes on intra- 
organisational pillars. Lastly, my study will highlight my findings of the qualitative 
analysis carried out in the concerning public bureaucracies in question.
The first section evaluates and elaborates on the changes in the bureaucracy 
within the New Right policies and patrimonialism. The study will also demonstrate 
the fact that the New Right policies, in pursuit of the re-making of the state, 
revitalized the lingering taints of patrimonialism on the bureaucracy. This point of 
view relies upon the position that New Right policies worsened patrimonial 
tendencies of public bureaucracy. The essence of this study is rather to put forth the 
patrimonial figures of public bureaucracy. However, this work will inevitably bear the 
influence of New Right policies upon bureaucracy.^*
I would like to mention the role of the state as a preluding figure, the
^  I will name the era between 1983 and 1993 as Özal Era. The use o f the ‘Motherland Party 
governments’ throughout some sections o f the work for this era denotes the time period from 1983 to 
1991 where MP lost the power to the coalition between the coalition o f True Path Party and Social 
Democrat Populist Party. But Özal era is extending to his presidency which terminates by his passing 
away in April 1993.
BirgUl Ayman Güler. Yeni Sağ ve Devletin Değişimi Yapısal Uyarlama Politikaları ^Ankara: 
Türkiye ve Orta Doğu Amne İdaresi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1996), pp. 14-43, pp.43-71.
Metin Heper and Selçuk Sancar. The Post 1983 Turkish Bureaucracy: A Patrimonial 
Rational Productive Model, a typescript, 1996. The point that these authors make is that all 
patrimonialism is a result o f bureaucratic ruling tradition, however in this work 1 will evaluate the 
relation between structural changes bureaucracy and patrimonialism.
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transformation process being targeted by the New Right policies. Though this study 
tries to envisage the attempts to transform public bureaucracy into rational-productive 
model within Weberian perspective, The New Right polices have evident influence 
upon transformation of public bureaucracy. This work feels responsible for infringing 
into the reformation of the term ‘state’ and the link between the state and public 
bureaucracy.
First, I will extrapolate this link in relation to the patrimonialism in 
bureaucracy within the context of Turkey. Ozal and the Motherland Party (MP) 
governments had been the avant-garde figures to apply the New Right policies in 
Turkey. The very applications within the transformation of bureaucracy will be 
shedding light on comprehending how 1980s governments in Turkey perceived public 
bureaucracy.
As a departure point I will summarise the transformation of the remaking of 
‘state’ in the New Right policies. The very approach brought by the New Right 
policies illuminates the transformation attempts of administrative reforms in a 
different way.^  ^This is why the term ‘state’ was redefined in the 1980s in line with 
the global changes in the world. The prerogatives of the New Right became the main 
criteria for the reformulation process. The restructuring of the state, also in this sense, 
denotes the reformation of a new social order.
These superficial headlines require a more complex explanation. However, 
since the concerning theme is public bureaucracy, this work will confine its limits to 
the emphasis laid over bureaucracy in the new social transformation.
Şinasi Aksoy, ‘Yeni Sağ ve Kamu Yönetimi’, Kamu Yönetimi Disiplini Sempozyumu 
Bildirileri, Vol. II, TODAIE UYBE-TUS Publications, Ankara, 1995.
70 Cahit Tutum, Kamu Yönetiminde Yeniden Yapdanma. (Ankara: TESAV Publications, 1993)
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The previous chapters have intensively dealt with the reform attempts to 
transform Turkish public bureaucracy into the desired form of pattern. The New Right 
programs also asserted to change the perception of bureaucracy in a peculiarly 
different way. That is to say that reform attempts, which have dealt with so called 
‘administrative reform’ have limited themselves to equating this jargon with the 
amelioration of bureaucratic structure. The New Right replaced the developmental 
approach by bringing in completely new approach to the perception of the role of 
bureaucracy. The developmental approach, which equates administrative reform with 
bureaucracy, was substituted with an overall assault in the pursuit of transformation of 
the state structure.^' The New Right’s discourse was targeting the change of the 
complete state. These were labelled as ‘transformation of public sector’ and 
‘transformation of state’. One of its most important repercussions was the jargon 
utilised by the Motherland Party. Turgut Özal was mentioning the transformation
program, which they initiated under the overblown name: ‘Great Structural
 ^ nTransformation Program. Yapısal Değişim)
Consequently main objective of New Right policies became to change the 
whole structuring and general jurisdiction areas of the state. The kernel role of 
bureaucracy in the developmental approaches, within administrative reform programs, 
deteriorated in the 1980s. Bureaucracy was transforming itself into a sub-system to be 
minimised like the whole state structure.^^ The other half of this overall assault on the 
state was a societal change in which the state was withdrawing itself from its 
regulating spheres. The New Right’s argumentation was that the state would have to
Gencay Şayian,. ‘Bir Yapısal Değişim Sorunu Olarak İdari Reform’, Kemal Fikret Arık’a 
Armağan, SBF-TODAIE Joint Publications, Ankara, 1973), pp. 492-514. In fact changes within 
bureaucracy have got to do with structural changes in the system 
Cahit Tutum, ibid..
73 Gencay Şayian, ibid.
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withdraw from spheres in which it intervened. These were being united under the 
discourse of common interests of conservatism and neo-liberal circles. The state as an 
overall structure was to be re-made and re-defined.^"* The neo-liberal argument 
opposed the extensive role of the state on the economic sphere; meanwhile, the 
conservative argument remarked its critique on its extensive role in the regulation of 
private sphere. In this sense the motor engine role of bureaucracy in the remaking of 
state was de-emphasized.^^
In this sense, the state was conceived as a regulator, which would in no way 
intervene in the economic sphere, and maintain itself as an arbitrator. The most 
important tool to transform the state was bureaucracy in itself. The formulation of the 
state also means the reformulation of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy was deemed as a 
burden on the restructuring of state.^  ^The discourse of the New Right movement on 
the minimisation of the state was set off for this process with the minimisation of 
bureaucracy. The very reason why bureaucracy was conceived, as a burden was the 
emphasis laid over such concepts as efficiency and effectiveness. As a source of 
employment and finance to charge infrastructural development, in the economical 
sense, bureaucracy was becoming an overload for the whole system. Bureaucracy in 
this sense would have to be minimised. It would have to stop being a burden on the 
whole structure. It meant that minimisation of bureaucracy would inevitably 
accompany minimisation of state. Here, minimisation of the state becomes enigmatic 
in that minimisation of state does not actually imply minimisation of state in social
Birkan Uysal Sezer, ‘Büyük Devlet-Küçük Devlet Tartışması’ Amm İdaresi Dergisi, Vol. 
25, issue. 4 (December 1992), pp. 17-20
Birgül Ayman Güler. Yeni Sağ ve Devletin Değişimi Yapısal Uyarlama Politikaları (Ankara: 
Türkiye ve Orta Doğu Amne İdaresi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1996), pp. 14-43 
Birgül Ayman Güler, ibid., and Şinasi Aksoy, ibid.
’’ Mehmet Barlas. Turgut Özal’ın Anıları (İstanbul: Sabah Yayıncılık ve Matbaacılık, 2'“* 
edition, 1994), p.285
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78sphere.
This also has vitally important repercussions on the role of bureaucracy. 
Bureaucracy became highly critical issue as a pivotal figure to inspire the 
minimisation of state in its general sense^ .^ The transformation of bureaucracy was 
obstructed by patrimonialism embedded in the structure within this specific era. 
Attempts to minimise public sector ironically enlarged bureaucracy.
Having examined the New Right, now I will turn my attention to the inner 
structuring of bureaucracy. The present study will deal with the taints of 
patrimonialism on the basis of different criteria. These will be the division of work, 
the presence of job specification and job definition, delegation of authority, appraisal, 
recruitment processes, and promotion policies applied within public bureaucracy. 
These elements will be exclusively dealt with the New Right policies and 
patrimonialism. These intra-organisational elements were influenced by the remaking 
of public bureaucracy in line with the prerequisites of the New Right policies.
The study will show how the transformation of bureaucracy into rational 
productive model was blocked by patrimonial taints. These intra organisational 
criteria will depict the way in which bureaucracy turned into a patrimonially 
functioning one. The third section will project these insights by means of interviews 
carried out in the Undersecretariat for the Foreign Trade and State Planning 
Organization. These interviews which will aid us in the comprehension of 
patrimonialism inherent in Turkish public bureaucracy, were carried out in 1996 
within the relevant organisations. The concerning practical insights will be evaluated
Noel Sullivan ‘The New Right: The Quest for a Civil Philosophy in Europe and America’, 
The Nature o f the Right European and American Politics and Political Thought since 1789 (Roger 
Eatwell and Noel Sullivan ed., London: Pinter Publications, 1992)
’’ Donald C. Rowan., Gelişmiş ve Gelişmekte Olan Ülkelerde Bürokrasilerin Karşılaştmlması- 
İstatiki Bir Analiz,{ translated into Turkish by Çiçek Refik), ( Ankara: State Personnel Administration
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in a rather briefly to understand patrimonial taints within bureaucracy. The interviews 
are methodologically qualitative analyses that were carried out about specification of 
different themes of bureaucracy.
4.2. New Right and Structural Rearrangements in Public Bureaucracy 
enlivening Patrimonial Taints
4.2.1. General Outlook at the Transformation o f Public Bureaucracy in the pre-1983s 
Era
This section will deal with the institutional arrangements of the New Right 
policies within public bureaucracy. These institutional rearrangements for the 
structural transformation turned out to accelerate and intensify patrimonial taints in 
public bureaucracy. I will deal with the structural changes in the economy 
bureaucracy. Public bureaucracy was assuming an absolute control over the economic 
affairs until the first half of 1980s.®° In order to liberalise the setting in the 1980s, for 
the New Right policies which had already got started in the second half of 1970s, the 
main target was the economy bureaucracy so that it would enable to transform the 
societal change desired by the total New Right policies. The New Right Policies
• · Q 1
cannot be confined to Turgut Ozal’s era.
I will firstly be concerned with the institutional arrangements of these policies. 
These changes concretized themselves in the 24*'’ of January Economic Decisions in 
1980. Actually, the bureaucrats who prepared these programs came to be the leading 
cadres to apply these policies in the first half of the 1980s. In fact, these applications 
may be conceived to be the institutionally arrangements for the patrimonialism. These 
were being facilitated by the fiscal and monetary adjustment accompanied with
Directorate, September 1991).
Ahmet Evin. ‘Bureaucrats in Turkish Politics’ Private View, 1 (Spring-Summer, 1996) and 
see also Gencay Şayian, ‘Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Bürokrasisi’, Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye 
Ansiklopedisi, (İstanbul; İletişim Yayınları, 1984), vol. 2, p.303
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commercial and foreign currency adjustments.
The trend until the mid-1970s was the state’s support for the development of 
financial sector and industrialisation.^^ Public bureaucracy was realizing the regulation 
over these sectors. In the second half of 1970s there emerged a shift to the 
liberalization of the financial sector in order to mobilise domestic resources and to 
overcome the difficulties faced in getting foreign loans. The political elites iniated a 
number of structural adjustments to synchronize these regulations to conform to the
84global economic changes within the sphere of economics.
To realize this, Turkey made stand-by agreements with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) four times, and the governments held up contracts of Sectoral 
Adjustment Programs five times with the same institution to regulate the 
transformation of sectoral development such as energy, agriculture, finance, tourism. 
These rearrangements done with the same global institutions required the remaking of
or
bureaucracy in the same sense. Here one fact is that these instutional rearrangements 
didnot happen all of a sudden. There was some kind of economic transformation all 
over the world making all these institutional arrangements obligatory in peripheral 
countries such as Turkey.
As well as these changes, there appeared an evitable obligation for the 
transformation of public bureaucracy. In the beginning of 1980s the institutional 
arrangements started. The significant arrangement took the form of the creation of an
82
BirgUl Ayman Güler, op. c it, pp.57-70
Metin Heper and Selçuk Sancar. The Post 1983 Turkish Bureaucracy: A Patrimonial 
Rational Productive Model, a typescript, 1996
*^Haldun Günalp, Gelişme Stratejileri ve Gelişme İdeolojileri, (İstanbul, Ankara: Yurt 
Yayınları, 1987)
Korkut Boratav and Taner Berksoy, Türkiye'de Kamu Mâliyesi, Finansal Yapı ve 
Politikalar, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Publications, 1993), pp. 119-120
*^To elaborate on the structural rearrangements see the Stephen Haggard and Steven B. Webb, 
Voting for Reform, Democracy, Political Liberalization, Economic Adjustment, A World Bank Book,
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alternative bureaucracy. The political elites of the time realized that the institutional 
arrangements that they were in pursuit of couldnot be carried out with the existing 
public bureaucracy. Since their aim was to change the economy bureaucracy that 
would enable economic transformation of economic system, it became a matter of 
domination of public bureaucracy and substituting it with the new one which would 
function patrimonially.*’ The institutional arrangements showed the high remark that 
these were encouraging the patrimonial taints inherent within the structure.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994)
®*'Korkut Boratav and Taner Berksoy, op. cit., p. 122 
*^Metin Heper and Selçuk Sancar, ibid.
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4.2.2. Creation o f Alternative Bureaucracy and Changes within the Prime Ministry o f 
Özal.
In the beginnings of the 1980s, there was a Coordination Council 
{Koordinasyon Kurulu) set up in order to regulate the balance between imports and 
exports, and relatedly the balance of wages.The institution established subsequently 
was the Monetary and Credits Council to determine the fiscal and monetary policies. 
The duties of the Coordination Council were juxtaposed as determination of basic 
principles in the import and export policies, providing coordination in foreign 
economic affairs and also advising the Higher Planning Council {Yüksek Planlama 
Kurulu), need be. On the other hand, the duties of Monetary and Credit Council {Para 
ve Kredi Kurulu) were established to coordinate monetary and fiscal policies, to 
advise about the subsidiary prices, and to control the balance of wages and to
oo
overcome the diffuculties envisaged in the distribution of credits and finance.
These developments reflect the point that the state in order to pacify the other 
traditional bureaucratic posts reacting to these institutional rearrangements tried hard 
to pacify and to offset the influence of the concerned posts. It is also a repercussional 
point that New Right’s outlook in the economic sphere activated patrimonialism 
within public bureaucracy. The newly set up organizations superseded the 
bureaucracy’s traditional functioning, which was interrupted by a number of ways. 
The first tactic was depriving the right to regulate several affairs in their jurisdiction 
areas. The second was creating a dual or an alternative organization area which would 
supersede the traditional bureaucracy’s roles.*  ^*
**Kamu Yönetimi Araştırması, Mali ve Ekonomik Kuruluşlar Araştırma Grubu Raporu, 
TODAİE Publications Number: 248, (Ankara, 1992), p. 192 and from the same research page 112
In fact these structural rearrangements were being supported by the business circles especially
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In fact, the institutional rearrangements in the 1980s infringed upon original 
jurisdiction areas of traditional bureaucracy. These things in question became some 
form of barricading in the fulfillment of their services. One other dimension of the 
patrimonial taints within the bureaucracy was that these alternative organizations were 
led up by political figures. There was a great deal of politicization of cadres within 
bureaucracy. The head of the organizations became politicians. The political elites 
went beyond this politicization to the extent that they formed an inner cabinet at the 
apex of bureaucracy over which they could assume an absolute control. The zone of 
movement for traditional bureaucracy was being confined more and more^ *^ .
These development which took place in early1980s meant an absolute break 
of the bureaucratic chain. Motherland Party’s governments.abused jurisdiction areas 
of traditional bureaucracy. The elements of traditional bureaucracy were not being 
permitted to participate in the application of policies. This has been a short account of 
how the structural adjustment programs were asserted.
I will now present developments within Ozal era.commencing with the first 
elections held up in 1983.
by TÜSİAD (Association o f Turkish Businessmen and Industrialists),it is o f high note that there was 
great deal laudatory announcement in the formal periodical o f this institution. In this paper, they 
appreciated these efforts and supported them by heart, TÜSİAD, Кати Yönetimi Bürokrasisi, TÜSİAD 
Publications, Т/83.10.78. (İstanbul, October 1983), p. 45 
’°Birgül Ayman Güler, op. c it, p .61
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4.2.3.Prime Ministry o f Özal (1983-1989)
The institutional arrangemnts iniatiated pre-1983 got permanet in the post-
1983 era which signified the power of MP. Many of the juridiction areas of Monetary 
and Credits Council were enlarged by the MP government in contrast to the 
confinement of the jurisdiction areas of the High Coordination Council which once 
used to have an overwhelming influence over economy bureaucracy. Many of the 
jurisdiction areas and powers of such institutions were transfered to the newly 
developed alternative bureaucratic organizations.
It was an important strategy that political power to adjust to the New Right 
Policies transferred so many spheres of jurisdiction to the alternative bureaucracy. 
Meanwhile, the political elites kept an absolute control over these alternative 
institutions. The most distinct new created alternative bureaucratic agency was the 
Undersecretariat for the Foreign Trade and the Treasury. (UFTT) {Hazine Dış Ticaret 
Müstesarligî) It approriated authority already granted to the Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Industry.^* The creation of the UFTT was 
an important reflection of the policies for the activation of patrimonial tendencies in 
the bureaucracy.
It was also of high note that UFTT was directly connected to the prime 
ministry. Under the leadership of Özal the top figures of MP were so indulgent and 
industrious in this process that transformation all over bureaucracy became very swift. 
The complete alternative bureaucracy was under the personal control of the political 
power, namely the Prime Minister. One could easily observe the deterioration of
’ ’This institution was established with the DFL Number: 118, dated with December 12th, 1983 
and legislation numbered 3274 and BirgUl Ayman Güler, op. cit., pp. 61-62
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power granted to the State Planning Organization. (SPO) (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı) 
The acceleration of the omnipotence of patrimonialism, and the revitalization 
of this tendency gave to the way that the newly created organisations superseded 
etatist (conceived to be so) traditional bureaucratic posts. These circles were being 
conceived etatist and conservative in their tune. The MP cadres considered the posts 
of traditional bureaucracy as those that curbed transformation within bureaucracy and 
were likely to sabotage the process.There was some kind of regulation and control 
system created by the political elites in order to sustain the rearrangements within 
organization of bureaucracy. A process of revitalization of patrimonialism emerged 
whereby the whim of political elites became evident and dominant. There were even 
advisory statements of the World Bank about the sine quo non-elimination of 
influence of traditional bureaucratic posts. The World Bank also wanted these cadres 
to accelerate the process of rearrangement of bureaucratic organization. However 
there still remained the question of the leadership of these alternative organisations. 
By whom these organisations would be led was an importEint question.
The ‘imported’ princes who were interestingly young and American educated 
would lead the newly created organisations. Preferably these new paramount figures 
should have worked in the prominent international financial centres such as IMF; 
World Bank, United Nations concerned units in United States of America. '^*
The second dimension of institutional arrangements was the use of funds 
directly by the ministry. In the modem sense relating to nation states one of the most
’^For the quasi formulations, see Metin Heper ‘ The State and De-bureaucraticization: The 
Case o f Turkey’, International Social Science Journal, 126 ( November 1990), pp. 605-615
’^Metin Heper and Selçuk Sancar. The Post 1983 Turkish Bureaucracy: A Patrimonial 
Rational Productive Model, a typescript, 1996 and see also the, Ahmet Evin. ‘Bureaucrats in Turkish
Politics’ Private View, 1 (Spring-Summer, 1996) 
’“'Birgül Ayman Güler, op. c it, p.61
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important duties of the public bureaucracy is the efficient use of public resources.^^ In 
this era a fund system was created and these funds were directly used by these new 
institutions of bureaucracy under the incentive of the Prime Minister. The budgetary 
concerns were given to the Prime Minister, offsetting the concerned agencies such as 
the Ministry of Finance and High Coordination Council^^. The MP saw the budgetary 
process as an obstacle to the reforms that they were trying to carry out. The influence 
of concerned agencies superseded traditional bureaucracy’s powers in these budgetary 
concerns by means of funds.
One of the researches done on the use of funds by alternative bureaucracy was 
asserting the fact that the funds used by the MP governments were not subject to 
judicial review. The alternative bureaucracy could handle these funds rather easily and
07under the incentive of the Prime Minister.
4.2.4. Legal Basis o f Structural Arrangement within Public Bureaucracy
One may wonder how these structural arrangements were arranged and on 
what legal basis. The legal bases of these structural arrangements were not realised 
and legitimated on the basis of laws and the other necessary legislations. The political 
elites of the time rather preferred to pass decrees in the force of law (Kanun 
Hükmünde Kararname) (DFL). Actually political elites in the concerned era deemed 
decrees in the force of law as practical means that they could legitimate these 
structural arrangements within public bureaucracy. Legislating a decree in the force of 
law was referring to the rationale that political elites would not bother themselves with
’^Kamu Yönetimi Araştırması- Mali ve Ekonomik Araştırmalar Grubu Raporu and Boratav 
and Berksoy, ibid., p. 123
Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 1980’den I990’a kadar Makro Ekonomik Politikalar: Türkiye 
Ekonomisindeki Gelişmelerin Analizleri ve Bazı Değerlendirmeler (Ankara: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı 
Basın ve Yayın Birimi, 1990), p. 35
’’Kamu Yönetimi Araştırması- Mali ve Ekonomik Araştırmalar Grubu Raporu, p .l39
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drawbacks in passing legislation. These drawbacks would be the negative politics 
utilised by the bureaucratic elites. The constitution granted this right to pass decrees in 
the force of law on the condition that this practice would be utilised in the emergency 
matters.^* On of the researches carried over this era puts forth the fact that there were 
91DFLs passed in 1983,46 DFLs passed in 1984 in comparison to the interval 
between 1972-1978 which witnessed only 17 DFLs passing.^^
I will also elaborate on the seopes of these DFLs. The scope of DFLs is studied 
over three fields of rearrangement within publie bureaucracy. The first was the 
institutional rearrangement within all public bureaucracy. The seeond theme of DFLs 
scoj)e was personnel administration regime. The third point was the rearrangement of 
administrative practices within public bureaucracy. As soon as MP governments came 
to the power, they started to apply these changes by reorganisation of public 
bureaucracy and re-arrangement of public personnel r e g i m e . I n  February 1984, the 
MP government passed a DFL unifying all regulations of administrative practices. 
These practices were also reflected into the local administrations in the very way 
leading to the establishment of Metropolitan Municipality Administration’
1 will derive two concluding remarks on the legal basis of these struetural 
rearrangements. The first high note is that there was not a total approach brought by 
the political power in grasping the rearrangement of publie bureaucraey. The 
Motherland Party remised preparing the legal basis of these structural rearrangements. 
That is to say that they encouraged enlivening the patrimonial taints in the public 
bureaucracy. The use of DFLs in the very legitimisation of these structural
^*BirgUl Ayman Güler, op. cit., p.63
’’Ministry o f Finance, Decrees in the force o f law, Vol: 3, (Ankara: 1990), p. 16.
'’’BirgUl Ayman Güler, op. cit., p.63
‘” Kamu Yönetimi Uzmanlan Demeği, Кати Yönetiminde Yeniden Düzenlenme, Publication 
Number:!, (Ankara: February, 1993)
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rearrangements was an important factor that disturbed the harmonious functioning of 
public bureaucracy. The resultant of all these arrangements was what some authors 
say the dual bureaucracy or the alternative bureaucracy interchangeably. The second 
derived conclusion may be the dissolution of present bureaucracy. In this process 
rather than emphasising and reinforcement the legality element in Turkish public 
bureaucracy, to turn the bureaucracy into the model of rational productive model, they 
superseded the legality dimension. This process was curbed by potential 
patrimonialism within the public bureaucracy.
4.2.5. Politicization o f Public Bureaucracy
The political power tried to politicise public bureaucracy by means of 
miscellaneous ways. The MP governments considered bureaucracy as some kind of 
institution completely servile to the political power. What they firstly tried to carry out 
was the over politicization of bureaucratic cadres. The cadres within the MP were 
consolidated within the public bureaucracy. Since the Motherland Party was not a 
party involving single tendency, different segments of bureaucracy were shared among 
the different tendencies of Motherland Party. Especially there was a great deal of 
dispute in the consolidation of the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) {Milliyetçi Hareket 
Partisi) cadres and former Nationalist Salvation Party (NSP) (Milli Selamet Partisi) 
cadres. The target institutions were the State Planning Organization, (Devlet Planlama 
Teşkilatı) Turkish Radio Television Broadcasting Corporation (TRT-Türkiye Radyo 
Televizyon Kurumu) and Ministry of National Education, (MEB-Milli Eğitim 
Bakanlığı). The other fields, that such kinds of patrimonial figures tainted, were the 
administrative units engaged in the recruitment of sub-governors and the other 
administrative posts. The preference was surely favourable for the cadres
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mentioned.'®^
The cadres being recruited into the economy bureaucracy were from the 
stereotypical bureaucrats of economy bureaucracy in Turkey of 1980s. These young 
bureaucrats were mostly liberal and more contemporary figures than the ones recruited 
into the other side of public bureaucracy such as TRT and MEB. In fact the cadres at 
the economic liberalization were oriented to give a more contemporary outlook rather 
than the cadres at the other segments of public bureaucracy renowned for its over­
tuned conservative nationalist tendencies. More liberal oriented people were selected 
to give the impression that they were the fitting stereotypes into these ranks. The 
cadres of ultra-nationalists and militants of nationalist conservatives were dominating 
the other side of bureaucracy in the 1980s. This dual situation between present 
administration in the economy bureaucracy and other sections of public bureaucracy 
was signifying the heyday of patrimonialism in Turkish public bureaucracy. The
monopoly of patrimonialism dominating the bureaucracy was being held by the
1conservative nationalist surroundings.
The New Right policies were based upon the classical liberalism in its basic 
sense. But the thing was that the New Right policies were not in its total reflected to 
the administrative system. Given the fact that there was a great deal of politicization 
of public bureaucracy, one could easily observe over blending of patrimonialism. This 
over blend of patrimonialism within Ozal era gave some kind of idea that the 
bureaucracy lost its mison d’être. The policies to realise general interest did not mean 
anything to bureaucracy. It was because of the fact that bureaucracy became a simple 
tool in which many groups struggled for power and cadrization.
102xMetin Heper ‘ The State and De-bureaucraticization: The Case o f Turkey’, International 
Social Science Journal, 126 ( November 1990), pp. 605-615
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4.2.6. Domination o f A Single Individual within Turkish Public Bureaucracy
There was the domination of a single person in the public bureaucracy in this 
era. The leading cadre of the Motherland Party became influential in this era. This 
development was subsequented by centralisation of Turkish public bureaucracy. There 
were two dominant tendencies within Turkish public bureaucracy. The first one was 
the dominance of a single individual figure. The second one was the centralisation of 
power vested in one person. Actually one of the things that facilitated these 
developments was the overemphasis put on the executive means by 1982 Constitution. 
One of the basic underlying philosophies of 1982 Constitution was targeting the 
reorganisation of the administrative system in this Centralized manner implicitly. All 
the powers granted to public bureaucracy were delegated to the top names in 
bureaucracy.*®^
One fitting example might be given to the incident that administrations of 
State Economic Enterprises were given to the Higher Planning Council and the 
managers of these institutions. Some scholars put forth the fact that ‘the tendencies to 
centralise Turkish public bureaucracy approximated itself to the hegemony of 
personality within bureaucratic structure’. The main pillars of bureaucracy formality, 
institution, rules and regulations, administrative discretion, public good, merit career 
were all neglected and remised’ Having neglected all these pillars, the structural 
rearrangements of the New Right policies reinforced and activated patrimonialism 
inherent'® .^
4.2.7.Global Support for the Structural Rearrangements within Turkish Public
103Birgiil Ayman Güler, op. cit., p.65
Grand, ‘İktidar ve Kamu Yönetimi Bağlamında İdarede Merkezileşme Olgusu’, Amne 
İdaresi Dergisiyo\\22fp. 4, (December, 1989), p .l7
105Birgül Ayman Güler, op. cit., p.65
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Bureaucracy
Global financial centres such as the World Bank supported the initiation of 
structural rearrangements within public bureaucracy. The World Bank continually 
asserted that ‘The reformers have got to curb the power of bureaucracy.’ On the other 
hand, the World Bank was renouncing the reformers to carry out these structural 
rearrangements with a great deal of determinism. There were master programs 
prepared by these global financial institutions about the privatization schemes and 
related administrative reforms continuously. These programs were prepared in order to 
get Turkey’s administrative system perfectly adapted to the global structural
rearrangements. 106
4.2.8. Presidency o f Ozal
One other dimension of these structural gained an another important 
dimension when Turgut Ozal became the president in 1989. Ozal wanted to keep an 
absolute eye on the public bureaucracy. The jurisdiction areas of the alternative 
bureaucracy were delegated to the state ministries. It was because of the fact that Ozal 
could influence these figures having the title of state ministers. In stead of relegating 
these powers of alternative bureaucracy to those institutions, which these already 
belonged to, Ozal delegated these powers to the state ministries. State Economic 
Enterprises were given to the jurisdiction area of state ministries. The influence of 
single individual figures maintained in the form of former-prime minister and newly 
president control. State Ministries jurisdiction occupied importance on the basis that 
distribution of state ministries was based upon the whim of politicians. In fact, the rise
'^ '’Stephen Haggard and Steven B. Webb, Voting for Reform, Democracy, Political 
Liberalization, Economic Adjustment, A World Bank Book, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 
p.l5 and also for such kinds o f prescription the Leila Frischtak and Izak Atiyas ed. Governance, 
Leadership, and Communication: Building Constituencies for Economic Reform (Washington DC. :The
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of number of state ministries was important in order to be able to depict rise of 
patrimonialism in this era. This kind of approach also gave way to a great deal of 
flexibilization within bureaucratic posts and offsetting power of traditional 
bureaucracy in the era of presidency of Ozal.
I have demonstrated the changes within public bureaucracy that took place 
within the context of structural arrangements in Ozal Era. The main point that the 
study wants to make out is that these structural rearrangements carried out fevered 
potential patrimonial taints embedded in Turkish public bureaucracy. The dissolution
process which already started at the bureaucracy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
108economy bureaucracy spreaded other segments of public bureaucracy . To which 
extent the rise of patrimonialism was deliberately supported is vague. It was rather an 
unwanted outcome, which brought about disruption of bureaucracy. The newly created 
alternative bureaucracy completely superseded the traditional bureaucracy’s powers.
What the study tries to discover is not the patrimonial taints in its purest sense 
but patrimonial tendencies that curbed the transformation to a rational-productive 
model type of bureaucracy. Meanwhile, rational productive model type of bureaucracy 
in this study’s sense is an exact fitting model to the New Right’s structural 
arrangements into the administrative system.
4.3. Evaluation of the Main Pillars of Turkish Public Bureaucracy in Ozal 
Era in the Context of Patrimonialism
The structural rearrangements within bureaucracy itself also reflected
World Bank, 1996), p.304
‘“^ Sit Grand, ibid., p .l9  and see also the Tacettin Karaer, ‘12 Eylül ve Türk Kamu Yönetiminin 
Yeniden Düzenlenmesi’, Amne İdaresi Dergisi, Vol:23, Issue:2, (September, 1987), pp. 29-54 and 
‘Türk Kamu Yönetiminde Devlet Bakanlığı Sorunu’, Amne İdaresi Dergisi, Vol;23, Issue: 2, (June, 
1990), pp.44-74
'®*Burcu Bostanoğlu, ‘Dışişleri Bakanlığının Uluslarası Politik Sistemdeki Değişime Uyum 
Sorunu’, Amne İdaresi Dergisi, vol:23, issue:l, (March, 1990), pp. 39-47
51
themselves onto the main pillars of public bureaucracy. The main pillars that this 
study will be covering upon are rules and regulations, irrevocability of bureaucracy, 
public good, delegation of authority, administrative discretion, social security, and 
also the legality of bureaucratic administration. These changes were oriented to the 
minimisation of public bureaucracy. Consequently, the oriented structure was 
completely a new one to transform and regulate the structural rearrangement. The 
target modeling for public bureaucracy was the rational productive model. Since the 
rational productive model is highly based upon the development and maturation of the 
legal rational model, the efforts to transform public bureaucracy did not appear to be 
working perfectly. As it can be seen in the Turkish context, the legal side of public 
bureaucracy was not strong enough to be able to yield up to rational productive model. 
The very reason weakening the legal side was patrimonialism embedded in the 
structure of bureaucracy.
On the other hand, Turkish public bureaucracy was overemphasising 
instrumental rationality, which meant that bureaucracy was overemphasising the 
means, rather the ends. The political elites tried to pacify the bureaucratic elites on the 
reason that they were becoming more and more instrumental rationaled especially, 
after 1950s. In fact, the structural rearrangements that one could observe were 
orienting the final shot on bureaucratic elites'*^ .^ Since these reformative and 
reformulative attempts in the Ozal era were emphasising on ‘getting things done’ (in 
OzaTs terminology: 'i^bitiricilik'^^^ ), the substantive rationality was the type of 
rationality in which the public bureaucracy was supposed to function"’. This finding
'“’Metin Heper, ‘The State, Democracy and Bureaucracy in Turkey’, the State and Public 
bureaucracies, (Metin Heper ed., New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), p.29
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may be backed up by the finding that as soon the MP came to power, they 
immediately passed a number of decrees in the force of law to change the basic pillars 
of public bureaucracy."^ The very creation of alternative bureaucracy was an evidence 
of this substantial rationality on the commonly held reason that the MP governments 
could not keep up with the present public bureaucracy. However one point lacking at 
these applications was that they were neglecting preparation of all exclusive 
legislations on which these structural rearrangements could be legitimised. The 
legality of public bureaucracy was already being disrupted in order to provide and 
sustain the circumstances in which alternative bureaucracy could develop itself. At 
this point, patrimonial practices were pioneering to dominate public bureaucracy. 
Although the political elites in 1980s at the time faced up obstacles put by the 
decisions of the Constitutional Court, they were making use of loopholes in the 
legislations.
Having asserted this preluding information, the intra-organisational pillars of 
public bureaucracy need to be elaborated over. My aim is to project these patrimonial 
taints in bureaucracy within these micro units.
4.2. ¡.Division o f Work
The division of work within Turkish public bureaucracy was not a clearly 
defined one. There were many loopholes within the definition of the work. As a 
historical legacy of the bureaucratic ruling tradition, the principle of division of work 
was not resting upon very strong tenets'". The concerning subpillars of job 
specification and job definition were mostly underestimated terms. Despite the fact 
that the reform attempts within Turkish public bureaucracy tried to assert a number of
"^Birgül Ayman Güler, op. c it, p.64
’’^ Metin Heper, Türk Kamu Bürokrasisinde Gelenekçilik ve Modernleşme: Siyaset Sosyolojisi
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proposals to redefine these terms, they were not yielding. The fact to be stated is that 
before 1980s job definitions and term were pretty vague, though they seemed to be all­
exclusive. There were continuous and constantly emerging loopholes regarding the job 
specification and job definitions. The MP was abused these loopholes. The definitions 
and job specifications were made more and more flexible and subjected to continuous 
changes. Given the fact that there were no strict job specification and definition, many 
people were recruited into the bureaucratic posts regardless of their qualifications, 
because of the cadrization inherent in the MP. This flexibility within the practices of 
job specification and job definition eased the attempts of cadrization of the 
Motherland Part in the concerned agencies.
The job definitions and job specifications were not explicitly stated. The terms 
were applied as if sustained in the air. On the other hand, job definitions and job 
specifications were based upon an enlargement of the criteria put by political power, 
which was able to sustain the overwhelming cadrization in line with the attempts to 
concentration the target units of public bureaucracy. There were great turnovers in the 
bureaucracy which were realised by this overwhelming flexibilization.
However the job definitions and job specification were important in the very 
selection of the cadres present in the economy bureaucracy. The criteria were put in 
order to create the milieu to direct the transformational rearrangements in bureaucracy. 
The cadres’ recruitment into the economy bureaucracy was being processed to which 
extent these cadres were indulgent and industrious in the fulfillment of these 
rearrangements. Especially in the Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade and Treasury, the 
job definitions had to be all-exclusive. Because extensive knowledge and information 
in political science were required of the cadres who meant to realise structural
Açısından Bir İnceleme, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1977)
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rearrangements. Moreover, these cadres were given an intensive inner house education 
by means of master and doctoral programs in the American universities.
The very remaking of economy bureaucracy also signified an other radical 
change. The changes in the knowledge and skills necessary for the posts of economy 
bureaucracy were changing the stereotype bureaucrats'*^. Bias towards the graduates 
of Ankara University Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
known as Mülkiye shifted to those of universities having an Anglo-Saxon type of 
education such as Middle East Technical University (METU) {Orta Doğu Teknik 
Üniversitesi) and Bosphorous University {Boğaziçi Üniversitesi). That was also 
targeting some aiming to break the chain of domination held up over bureaucracy by 
Mülkiye.
On the other hand, in the other sections of public bureaucracy there was a great 
deal of flexibilization in both the job definitions and job specifications. The political 
power flexibilized these terms in order to create the atmosphere for cadrization. Non 
existence of job specifications and job definitions gave way to the resultant political 
power used patronage to fill these cadres in order to distribute the tendencies within 
the Motherland Party"^. Sections of bureaucracy, other than those of economy, were 
chosen to be flexibilized in terms of job definitions and job specifications. This was 
because of the fact that these segments of public bureaucracy were not demanding too 
many sophisticated qualifications. Since the cadres of the Motherland Party wanted to 
back up the cadres at these other segments with substantial rationality, they 
emphasized personality rather than impersonality in the selection of cadres in the other 
segments of bureaucracy. The very transformation that the Motherland Party was
"‘'Nilüfer Göle, Mühendisler ve İdeoloji: öncü Devrimden Yenilikçi Seçkinlere, (İstanbul: 
İletişim Yayınları, 1986), and p.86 ff.
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pursuing, in the direction of rational productive model was curbed by means of 
complete ambiguity in the job specifications and job definitions. The political power 
had a dual point of view. In the economy bureaucracy, more exclusive definitions 
were brought to sustain the recruitment of the cadres needed to manage the structural 
rearrangements, whereas in the other segments of public bureaucracy they sought to 
flexibilize the other posts.
In what follows, I will deal with the impersonality of the public bureaucracy 
highlighting in what sense the bureaucratic experiences were carried out in accordance 
with legal bases and what kind of criteria were sought to provide the legal side of 
public bureaucracy.
4.3.2. Impersonality o f the Public Bureaucracy Between 1983 and 1993
In the Ozal era, the political power sought to decrease the impersonal order
within public bureaucracy. Impersonality was de-emphasized to sustain the structural 
rearrangements in the bureaucracy. The very reflection of this personal order was due 
to the dominance of the political power over bureaucracy. The impersonality had 
several dimensions.
The first dimension was the unclarity of the legal bases of regulations. The 
legislation, to provide the legal background, was ignored. The fact that legal base of 
the structural rearrangements was de-emphasized, gave way to the domination of 
public bureaucracy by the cadres of the Motherland Party. This is not to say that, there 
were no legal bases for the structural rearrangements but that they abused the essence 
of legal bases by infringing upon the essence of decrees in the force of law. In fact 
most of the DFLs were in accordance with the spirit of the 1982 Constitution. The 
implicit underlying philosophy was that they were demanding the bureaucracy to be
^'^Katnu Yönetimi Araştırması Genel Rapor, TODAİE, Ankara 1991
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dominated by substantial rationality. Most of the administrative applications were 
declared invalid by the Constitutional Court. Despite this happening, the political 
power proceeded very confidently.
The intra-organisational dimensions were carried out without subscribing to 
the laws. The first pillar was the merit principle. In this era, the very principle of merit 
was de-emphasized in favour of the technocratic skills. The underlying pillar of this 
philosophy was the rational productive model emphasising the substantive rationality 
in the targeting of getting things done in the desired direction by political power. The 
concrete example was the import of “princes” to the economy bureaucracy. There 
were bureaucrats consolidated in the economy bureaucracy who would act with the 
letter of the Motherland Party.
The merit dimension was also de-emphasized at the other segments of public 
bureaucracy. The cadres of the Motherland Party tried to pacify the people deserving 
to be promoted and bring the people who would work harmoniously with them. My 
point is not judgmental but I think that what the bureaucratic applications were 
lacking were the impersonality and the dominance of legal means in these intra- 
organisational criteria.
4.3.3. Application o f Merit Principle and Promotion Systems
In line with the patrimonial situation within the bureaucratic system, the
bureaucracy suffered from the abuse of merit principle. The point was that the criteria 
to be considered were not important in the application of merit principle, because 
merit principle was barricading the applications of these structural rearrangements.
The promotion policies also suffered these policies on the basis that whim of 
the political power emerged to promote the cadres in line with their ideology and
116.Tacettin Karaer, ibid.
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outlook of the outlook of Motherland Party. The promotion policies were really 
applied on the behalf of these benign cadres in line of the policies, applied by the 
Motherland Party. Especially those Motherland Party cadres in the economy 
bureaucracy were supported in terms of the power that they held up. On the other 
hand, they were increasingly reinforced in also terms of the financial means that they 
got. More financial incentives were given to those of UFTT bureaucrats and the 
environment of economy in which bureaucrats were working was made more 
competitive. These applications also aided in the creation of a difference between the 
posts of traditional bureaucracy and economy bureaucracy. On the other hand, the 
other agencies of public bureaucracy were pacified and given less financial incentives. 
On the other hand, many of the jurisdiction areas that they were holding were 
transferred to the new agencies of the alternative bureaucracy. The most important of 
these was the transfer of the powers held by the SPO to the UFTT.
4.3.4. Recruitment Process and Appraisal Process
The preference of the Motherland Party dominated by the single individual
figure of Özal in the recruitment of bureaucrats reflected itself in the economy
bureaucracy. They preferred to recruit bureaucrats on the basis of the technocratic
skills held by the incumbents. As already been put forth, mostly graduates of METU
and the similar universities were preferred. In fact Özal blamed the graduates of
Mülkiye on the basis that they were more and more instrumentally rationaled. The
graduates of Mülkiye emphasized idealistic approaches to the making of bureaucracy/
Özal’s point was that these structural rearrangements could not proceed with the
existing cadres of the Mülkiye. These cadres would have to be substituted by the
cadres having more technocratic skills, educated in the technical universities. The
preferred cadres would be engineers who would facilitate the social engineering
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especially by the restructuring policies“ ’. The qualifying examinations were based 
upon the testing of these technocratic skills.
On the other hand, patronage became an important factor determining who 
would be recruited into bureaucracy in other segments of bureaucracy. Although the 
job notifications were supposed to be publicly, jobs were only advertised in limited 
circles chosen by the political power.
The appraisal methods were not all exclusive. They were rather based upon the 
whim of political power. The ones who were working in the economy bureaucracy 
were given more emphasis on the process of economy bureaucracy. More methods 
were involved in line with the development of their technocratic skills than the 
traditional bureaucracy in the traditional sense. The technocratic skills were developed 
with the inner-house education programs (Hizmetiçi Eğitim Programı). Patronage 
dominated the other sphere of bureaucracy. Since the ultimate objective was the 
cadrization of the MP, they did not feel the necessity to develop the techniques of the
appraisal process. The main criterion became the whim of the superior unit. 118
4.3.5. Remaking o f the Public Personnel Administration
The remaking of the public personnel administration was significant in the
consolidation of the patronage system in the rearrangement of the public personnel
administration. There were three important assaults on the three pillars of the public
personnel administration. The first was the promotion policies; the second one was the
wage system and the type of employment.'
The remaking of the public personnel administration involves the promotion
"’Nilüfer Göle, ibid., p.86 ff.
"*Sit Grand, ‘İktidar ve Kamu Yönetimi Bağlamında İdarede Merkezileşme Olgusu’, Amm
idaresi Derg/sı, Vol:22,p. 4, (December, 1989), p .l9
H9ıBirgül Ayman Güler, op. cit., p.65
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policies pursued by the structural rearrangements. The first radical change was the 
promotion of a bureaucrat by three levels through a single appraisal. This 
flexibilization also superseded the cadres’ confidant of their promotion and offset 
secure promotion policies. This is to say that a bureaucrat was promoted by three steps 
in the personnel system. It was a simple tool to offset the cadres not wanted by the MP 
governments.
The second point on the public personnel was the wage system. The 
differentiation in the wage system had upset all of the wage systems. There after all 
was a great deal of imbalance within the bureaucratic posts doing similar things. This 
application has also eroded impartial side of bureaucracy on the basis of wage system. 
These applications were supported and legitimised by the laws in the force of decree. 
The unequal distribution was legitimated with substantial rationality gotten in terms of 
effectiveness. One such DFL was annulled by the Constitutional Court on the ground 
that the reasons for this legislation did not come out to be reliable. Despite the 
attempts to pass a legislation that would grant more responsibilities to the 
government, The Constitutional Court again annulled the legislation. The 
Constitutional Court annulled this legislation, because matters regarding the personnel 
matters could not be evaluated within the frameworks of mentality of effectiveness.
Although there were a large of number of attempts for legislation for the 
reconstruction of the personnel system. The Constitutional Court became the 
institution curbing the process. The MP governments tried to reorganise the personnel 
administration by means of DFLs. In fact these attempts of DFLs tried to disintegrate 
the total public personnel administration.
120Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararları, (AnkaraıTODAİE Publications, 1995)
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One other tactic was the spread of the contractual personnel application in the 
employment into the public bureaucracy. The application of the contractual personnel 
was aimed to ease the privatisation process of the State Economic Enterprises. 
Actually, the contractual personnel already had already existed in the jurisdiction of 
the personnel administration of public bureaucracy. However, the legislation passed in 
1984 made the contractual personnel status in the employment of bureaucrats a 
separate entity of status'^'. The very underlying target was offsetting the obstacles on 
the way to the privatisation. The second target was the minimisation of the cadres of
199civil servants, and secondly the cadres of the labourers.
In fact this goes in line with the minimisation of the state. This is to say that 
public bureaucracy was to be minimised in line with prerequisites of the era. But the 
very way to actualise these changes was not based on the impersonality. Political 
whim was regulating the total process under the leadership of the Motherland Party.
There in fact appears a point whether the very rational productive model goes 
hand in hand with the minimisation of the state. My answer through in this work is 
that it does go concurrently with the rational productive model.
On the other hand the jurisdiction area held up by the Ministry of Finance in 
the wage system was directly connected to the jurisdiction area of the Prime Ministry. 
One other finding is the deterioration of the social security system by means of the 
remaking of the personnel status system. The Motherland Party encouraged the 
remaking of these statuses. They in this sense did not want to envisage a social 
opposition on the behalf of worker unions. In the DFLs they were explicitly stating 
that the state was becoming the paragon figure to renew the contract of personnel not
m Maliye ve Gümrük Bakanlığı, Kanun Hükmünde Karanameler, Vol:3, Ankara, 1990 
'^^Birgül Ayman Güler, op. cit., p.66-67
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much giving much chance to the other parties such as the workers unions and 
personnel. The New Right mentality in this sense is clear that it doesn’t want to bother 
itself with such sorts of social opposition in the forms of syndicates, social pressure 
groups. Given the strength of the state structure in Turkey, the arrangements, which 
were dealed patrimonially, would offset the barricades, which would possibly curb the 
overall minimisation of the state. On the other hand the patrimonial rearrangements 
confronted the Constitutional Court. However one concluding remark is that all these 
rearrangements gave a way to the total disruption of the system.
These findings on the remaking of the public personnel show the heyday of 
patrimonial activities in line of the mentality of the Motherland Party. I have tried in 
this section to delineate the highlighting changes within public bureaucracy on the 
ground of intra organisational criteria. The following section will analyze these 
findings with the points made by bureaucrats interviewed in the SPO and UFTT.
4.2.6. Irrevocability o f Administrative Posts and Administrative Discretion
In this era one of the basic pillars of bureaucracy, irrevocability was disrupted.
The Motherland Party cadres created a great deal of disruption and caused
overwhelmingly high turnover rates in the bureaucracy. Actually within bureaucracy,
when one application disrupts the promotion and connected schemes, the other parts
are easily disrupted. The bureaucrats were appointed to the posts that had nothing to
do with the qualifications.
The administrative discretion was not practiced in the way that the rational 
productive model required to. Meanwhile, the intimate atmosphere wanted to be 
brought by the rational productive model was abused and the discretionary power was 
only granted to those who had parallel points of view with the Motherland Party. The
Motherland Party cadres just delegated the authority to sign to the other cadres in
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public bureaucracy. But the tutelage powers were granted to the bureaucrats who were
working harmoniously with the political power. 123
'^^Kamu Yönetiminin Yeniden Düzenlenmesi, Кати Kuruluşları İstihdam Politikası- Kamu 
Personeli Problemleri Yön Eylem Araştırması, ( with the courtesy o f Mr. Yaman Şahin) (Bureaucrat’s 
copy), 1982.
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION
5.1 Practical Insights into the Public Bureaucracy about the Related Era
In the present section, I will present the results of the qualitative analysis
carried out in the State Planning Organization and the Undersecretariat for the Foreign 
Trade and Treasury to inquire about patrimonial taints. The themes in the study are the 
authority dimension and the merit dimension, which were asserted by a number of 
scholars who already studied on the issue'^ "^ . I have added the dimension of their 
perception of bureaucracy. The fourth dimension, are the personal views on 
bureaucracy’s autonomy
5.1.1. Methodology o f the Study
The tool that I have used is the qualitative analysis. This tool enabled to get 
more insights about the bureaucrats’ opinions about the concerned era in question to 
minimise the red tape concerning getting permissions. To confess the reality, for this 
study bureaucrats were found patrimonially by means of liaisons in the SPO and 
UFTT. One other point is also regarding the stereotype of bureaucrats in the concerned 
agencies. The State planning Organization recruits more graduates of Mülkiye and 
The Undersecretariat recruits those from the universities having more competitive 
environments and having technocratic skills.
5.1.2. General Elaboration on the Study
Most of the interviewees put the point that the MP government first tried to 
offset the State Planning Organization by means of main pillars of rational productive 
model of bureaucracy. They tried to establish system of domination of people who had
124жMetin Heper, Türk Кати Bürokrasisinde Gelenekçilik ve Modernleşme: Siyaset Sosyolojisi 
Açısından Bir İnceleme, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1977)
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more technocratic skills rather than the ones who had more merit. In fact, the relations 
between superior and subordinate were de-formalized. The intimacy that the rational 
productive model intended to create was put into such a form that they wanted to 
establish a system of patrimonialism and patronage within the public bureaucracy. But 
according to the statements of bureaucrats in the SPO, the establishment of such a 
system did not work in the SPO rather these were the main pillars consolidated in the 
new structuring of the Secretariat. In fact, the bureaucrats in the Undersecretariat were 
happy with this environment of intimate despite the abuse of this to de-formalise the 
context of public bureaucracy. The administrative discretion, which is different from 
the authority to sign, is delegated to those who have more technocratic skills rather 
than those with merit. Especially in the State Planning Organization, in the name of 
the rational productive model, the administrative discretion was granted to those 
bureaucrats who were working more harmoniously with the Motherland Party. The 
bureaucrats in the Undersecretariat did not mention about such conflict in the 
concerned organization. It is because of the fact that the very formation of this 
institution was recruited with the stereotypical bureaucrats to work with Motherland 
Party’s governments more properly. On the other hand, within public bureaucracy, the 
rational productive model’s autonomy given to the line units was a disturbing factor 
for the ones in the SPO. In contrast to the SPO, the Undersecretariat’s bureaucrats saw 
it as very normal concern for the sake of functioning of bureaucracy.
The bureaucrats also opposed the extreme dimension of merit that when the 
superior doesn’t have to be involved for the simple activities. Actually what the 
bureaucrats in the SPO asserted that the very applications within public bureaucracy 
caused only disruption. Actually the Motherland Party abused dimensions of rational
productive model. They made use of these dimension for the sake of cadrization in the
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relevant agencies. But the bureaucrats in the Treasury deemed this incident as 
extraordinary happening. There were such kinds of approaches to themes of 
bureaucracy. Compared to those of the SPO in their evaluation about OzaTs era the 
bureaucrats in the UFTT were more conformist
In the following theme, I will highlight the merit dimension, The first point 
made by the rational productive model is that although any superior uses novel 
techniques, and even if he fails, the official can not be held responsible for this thing. 
At the merit dimension this was rarely practiced. It is one of the characteristics of the 
public bureaucracy that it absolutely wanted to keep an eye on the bureaucracy. 
Although this principle was wanted to be used, the bureaucracy used regulation 
system over the bureaucracy.
In fact within this era the bureaucrats elaborated repercussions of an another 
principle. This was the principle stating that political power could employ anybody 
they thought appropriate. These may be concretized by the paragon names of the 
Undersecretariat. The bureaucrats in the SPO seemed to have been complaining about 
these bureaucrats. In fact the SPO bureaucrats stated that this principle caused a great 
turnover rate within the public bureaucracy. The Undersecretariat’s bureaucrats found 
this happening normal. They also asserted that it would enable bureaucracy to function 
much better.
The bureaucrats of both organisations favoured the inner house education and 
pre-service training within bureaucracy. The pre-service training is one of the 
achievements of the rational productive model. Especially after 1980s, public 
bureaucracy made use of this. The fact is that the incumbents in this education 
program are given technocratic skills. Bureaucrats in both of the coincided the point
that it was benevolent for public bureaucracy. In fact, this became one of the catch
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phrase to adjust bureaucrats to the structural rearrangements in 1980s.
One other theme is that a bureaucrat coined the rational productive model’s 
development of skills of bureaucrats. But bureaucrats of SPO stated that the 
applications were tainted with patrimonialism. Bureaucrats all agreed on the point that 
a structural change was needed for public bureaucracy. The political power abused the 
applications to transform the bureaucracy into the desired form.
The bureaucrats all deemed bureaucracy’s transformation in the restructuring 
of state. They also sympathised that this transformation phase had to be managed well. 
They also asserted that those holding the political power in the concerned era made 
serious mistakes. All the milieus of bureaucrats interviewed acceded the point that the 
mistakes made on the way to transform the bureaucracy into the form A, or form B/ 
created the impasse from which bureaucracy is suffering today. The impasses may be 
elaborated such as the great turnover rate and many more. The bureaucrats 
emphasized that bureaucracy had to gain a dimension on the application policies 
rather than barricading the application of policies.
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5.2. CONCLUSION
This study has highlighted patrimonial taints within Turkish public 
bureaucracy under the management of the political cadres of the Motherland party. 
Pursuit of transformation of public bureaucracy into the rational productive model was 
curbed by the potential taints within the bureaucratic structure. When the study names 
this potential patrimonialism, it does not directly refer to patrimonialism in its purest 
sense.
The first dimension of patrimonialism is the historical legacy of bureaucratic 
ruling tradition. The genealogy of bureaucracy in Turkish context has always suffered 
from this patrimonial tendency. The applications of the Republican era to transform 
the bureaucracy into the rational legal model turned out to be working not well. They 
were offset by the instrumental-rationality dominating Republican bureaucracy 
especially starting from the second half of 1930s.
The second dimension of this patrimonialism is the structural rearrangements 
in the 1980s in accordance with global changes all over the world. The structural 
rearrangements of 1980s gave way to an unintended revitalization the potential 
patrimonialism in the bureaucratic structure. When all these along the desire of the 
political power to radically change the bureaucracy, this yielded to a number of 
impasses in the bureaucratic structure. The activated patrimonialism started to 
dominate the whole structure. The Motherland Party tried to make public bureaucracy 
servile to the political power.
The process being administered by Motherland Party was so harsh that they
ignored the preparation of the legal basis of changes for the bureaucracy. The MP
governments not only neglected the legality dimension but also disrupted the whole
functioning of bureaucracy. The perception of bureaucracy as a simple tool in the eyes
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of Motherland Party’s cadres also disrupted bureaucracy’s traditional functioning. The 
target became a hide and seeks play for the cadres of the Motherland Party. Except for 
the economy bureaucracy, the public bureaucracy became a field for the maximisation 
of cadrization. In the economy bureaucracy, they laid much emphasis on the 
consolidation of fitting cadres into these ranks of the newly created organization such 
as the UFTT. Like most of the reform attempts in Turkish bureaucracy the state’s 
perception bureaucracy was not totally grasped. The state either added some 
structures into bureaucracy or offset the improperly functioning sections of 
bureaucracy
New Right was not the actual reason for patrimonialism. The Motherland Party 
was in the pursuit of under the leadership of Turgut Ozal, revitalized the 
patrimonialism. It also gave a weapon to the politieal elites of the time to offset the 
bureaucracy in many fields. In fact, the struggle going on from 1950s to the present 
time ended with the disruption of the total public bureaucracy.
On the other hand. New Right policies were taken as reference points for the 
political elites to legitimate the changes. Since the main mentality in the New Right 
policies was to minimize the total state bureaucracy became something to be 
minimised in parallel with the same process in the state structure. This also brought 
the emergency of taking measures in the minimisation of bureaucracy. The legal side 
lacking at the rational legal model of bureaucracy was totally eliminated. Though the 
changes were legitimated by superficial legal means, the Constitutional Court and the 
related judicial institutions annulled these legal means on the ground that they did not 
meet the prerequisites demanded by the constitution. The rational productive model’s 
applications became nothing but superficial means to disrupt the general functioning 
of bureaucracy.
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Though the study is in the awareness that there was so much work asserted in 
the fields of bureaucracy, this effort has been able to contribute the remark that New 
Right policies aiming the total transformation of the state also disrupted the general 
functioning of public bureaucracy in Turkey. It has also been able to depict the point 
that the legal side of public bureaucracy will have to be subjected to further 
development in the determination of the rules of the game for the jurisdiction of 
bureaucracy.
Within the light of these developments, I analysed the patrimonial 
characteristics of Turkish public bureaucracy. I also demonstrated that the New Right 
policies had inevitable effects on the resurrection of patrimonial taints in bureaucratic 
structure. Turkish public bureaucracy awaits more serious evaluation. I also suggest 
that bureaucratic reforms be evaluated miscellaneously and public bureaucracy be 
handled more seriously to reform and organize.
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